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Abstract 
Ghana is viewed as a relatively peaceful country in a sub region characterized by constant cycles 
of conflicts. Analysts have identified porous borders, drug, arm and human trafficking, terrorism, 
and other cross border crimes along the increasing levels of Islamist, insurgents and terrorist 
activities in the region as major security threats. For example, As Mali and Nigeria battle with the 
insurgency from Ansar din, and BH, respectively, the latter’s neighbors bear the brunt of the 
ongoing incidence.   
 A survey on global terrorism trends had ranked Ghana as a country with no incidence of casualties 
from terrorism between 1968-2006 (Sosuh 2011, p.14). Nevertheless, the recruitment of some 
Ghanaian graduates into the ranks of ISIL in August 2015 seems to contradict the pacifist notions 
about Ghana and susceptibility to terrorism a high possibility.  
Drawing on literature about terrorism and radicalization, the thesis analyzes and discusses the level 
of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threats of domestic and transnational terrorism. 
The analysis reveals that Ghana’s susceptibility to the menace of terrorism is real, and gradually 
building up. Using Nigeria-based BH as a referent point, the study identified that Ghana’s security 
is threatened by the transnational aspect of the BH insurgency. The revelations that some 
Ghanaians could be swayed by the ideological influences and the activities of BH is becoming a 
reality. Other factors that add weight to the BH risk include but not limited to lack of inter-agency 
cooperation, the ECOWAS policy of free movement of people and goods, and weak borders.  
The study admonish Ghanaian authorities to closely watch current social, political, economic and 
religious conditions such as poor governance, corruption, unemployment, poverty, and religious 
radicalization that could light the flames of terrorism in Ghana.   
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1.1Introduction 
Historical, and current events depict that no state is immune to the threats of terrorism. 
Terrorists know no borders, no boundaries in their quest to capture the world making 
almost all continents having a share of the throes of their martyr attacks, hijack gun battles 
which mostly target innocent civilians. Despite the conception of terrorism as a common 
security challenge to humanity (Ewi & Aning 2006), threats to states’ varies with respect 
to country,  continent or region, (Botha 2008; Davis 2012 p. 1). These variations in threats 
largely affect perceptions about terrorism and how states, and stakeholders should respond 
to them.  
As a country with no (major) record terrorism, it came as a surprise when news of activities 
of some groups linked to Boko Haram1  in certain parts of Ghana came up (Bokor 2014; 
Ghanaweb 2014). However, such allegations were debunked by the police (omgGhana 
2015). As a result, the cause for alarm regarding the prospects of terrorism within the 
country might have dwindled. Again, the year 2009 witnessed an alleged incident involving 
a suspected terrorist who transited from Ghana to the United States of America (Captain 
Brachie 2014; CBS News 2010) . It was not long when the country was plunged into a state 
of desperation by media reports of recruitment of some Ghanaians into the swelling ranks 
of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL/ISIS), in late August 2015 (cityfmonline 
2015; Ghanaweb 2015b). This situation contradicts the country’s credential as one of 
Africa´s relative peaceful and stable democracies2.. Evidently, a survey on global terrorism 
trends had ranked Ghana as a country with no incidence of casualties from terrorism 
between 1968-2006 (Sosuh 2011 p. 14). However, current events in Ghana regarding 
incidence of terrorism and the limited literature on violent extremism on Ghana puts the 
country in a state of dilemma. Yet, the few literatures that encapsulate the subject are 
normally restricted to the northern part of the country. This situation arises from the 
relatively limited violence within the country turning researchers’ attention to other areas 
in the West African sub- region which are more prone to violence.  
                                                          
1 See section 3.1 for details on BH 
2 Even though the country experiences social vices such as religious, political, and ethnic clashes, coupled with 
chieftaincy disputes, armed robbery, murder, serial killings, and rift between aggrieved groups and the state, 
Ghana has not experienced any major terrorist activity, and remains relatively peaceful in the sub region) 
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Nevertheless given Ghana’s present situation, there could be little skepticism about its 
vulnerability to the threat3 of domestic and transnational terrorism4 making the 
phenomenon a key research area. Attempts at this venture will provide insight into the 
phenomenon for purposes of policies which is paramount to state security, stability and 
survival.  
     1.2 Research Question 
Against this backdrop, the central research question is to what extent is Ghana vulnerable 
to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism? 
In order to answer the research question, the study would draw on the activities of Boko 
Haram (BH), and the conditions that occasioned their evolution5. This area of focus serves 
two important purposes; first, it offers the historical accounts of BH, and the factors that 
gave rise to its emergence as an important exemplary model for Ghana. This stems from 
the fact that Ghana and Nigeria share similar attributes along socio-politico-economic, and 
religious lines. And second, whether the existence of BH and its activities within and 
outside Nigeria could have the tendency to threaten the security and stability of Ghana. 
This position arises in light of the conscious efforts made by BH in toppling federal 
government of Nigeria, and its quest for regional expansion as seen in its merger with ISIS 
(Iaccino 2015; Solomon 2012; Zenn 2015). It is also premised on the simple assumption 
that BH’s activities could affect, and influence citizens beyond the boundaries of Nigeria. 
Lastly, the choice of the group as part of the research’s focus considers the possibilities of 
how the existing SPEAR conditions have constituted significant cause for BH-inspired 
insurgency in Nigeria, and the tendency for which they could/could not affect Ghana. The 
above constitute the medium for measuring the extent of the threat of transnational 
terrorism vis-à-vis Ghana. This is in line with Botha (2008 p. 34) research on the 
“challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa…” in which he argued that “the only way 
to identify factors that contribute to a country’s vulnerability is to study conditions in 
countries… that have been subject to terrorism”. In this regard, this research seeks to 
                                                          
3 See definition, conceptualization, and operationalization of the term at Appendix one 
4 See section 2.1 for definitions, and other details) 
5 See section 3.1 for details pertaining to the emergence of BH  
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examine the root causes of the phenomenon in order to offer insight relevant to complement 
efforts by counter terrorism officials and stakeholders with the view to counteracting it.  
Aside BH, and its activities, another important area of focus is the current Socio-politico-
economic, and religious conditions of Ghana. Domestic terrorism does not take place in a 
vacuum but through factors within a given country. As a consequence, same would 
constitute a significant source of assessing the measure of Ghana’s vulnerability to the 
threat of domestic terrorism.  
In light of this, face-to-face interviews, coupled with relevant literature studies and other 
secondary sources were consulted on the extent to which the rise of the group in Nigeria 
could affect the possibility for the emergence of similar group (s) in Ghana. Additionally, 
to achieve the purpose of answering the research question, the study explored efforts at 
investigating the current socio- politico-economic and religious (SPEAR) conditions in 
Ghana. 
The research’s focal point vis-à-vis BH spans the era the group emerged to date (2015). I 
argue that the choice of BH as a referent terrorist organization for this study stems from 
the conditions that necessitated its evolution. That notwithstanding, the study also makes 
inferences to other terrorists groups such as Al Qaeda, ISIS, and Al Shahaab.  It also draws 
on events in the entire African region, and beyond. For example, events in Somalia, Mali, 
and the United States of America (USA) are considered. In this regard, references and 
inferences were done based on the degree of relevance, and appropriateness. 
        1.3 Structure of the Thesis 
The study proceeds with chapter two which entails concepts, literature review, and 
theories. It is followed by chapter three which highlights factors that occasioned the 
evolution of BH, and the Ghana government’s collaborative efforts at countering it. 
Additionally, the chapter sheds some light on religious radicalization and violence in 
Ghana. Chapter four explores issues relating to methods and methodology, including the 
research’s respondents, reliability, validity and triangulation. Subsequently, the empirical 
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findings6 are analyzed and discussed, and some recommendations are offered. This would 
set the stage for conclusion.  
2.0 Chapter two  - Concepts, Literature review and Theories 
The primary purpose of a conceptual framework is to “ensure that everyone is working 
with the same definition and mental image” of the concepts used in a research (Berg & 
Lune 2012 p. 39). It is synonymous with operationalization, which aids the understanding 
of readers, and end-users of a research’s concepts as understood, and used by a researcher 
(Ibid.). It is therefore useful to conceptualize, and operationalize the following terms below 
since they carry with them some levels of ambiguity, and controversy within academic and 
policy circles, pitching scholars, policy analysts and bureaucrats against each other on 
different sides of the argument. 
             2.1 The concept of Terrorism 
Terrorism is a concept of controversy which has elicited thorny debate among stakeholders. 
Hoffman defines terrorism as “…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through 
violence or the threat of violence in the pursuit of political change…” (Hoffman 2006 p. 
40-41). However, this definition does not capture the actors involved in terrorism. But 
Cronin does perhaps partly. According to him, terrorism is the pursuit of a political goal 
by a non-state actor, through the use of violence against civilians with the intention of 
spreading terror  (Cronin 2006). Nonetheless, Cronin’s definition, like that of the U.S 
Department of State, lacks the complete component of the actors involved in the 
phenomenon. What is lacking in the above definitions is the fact that they exclude terrorism 
perpetrated by States. State terrorism is undertaken for the very reasons akin to those 
championed by non-state actors. The difference nonetheless, lies in their make-up. Like 
sub-national terrorism, States that engage in terrorism are perceived to lend support, and 
sponsorship to terrorism, and its related incidences. 
Additionally, a close look at the definitions above reveal a common theme which terrorists 
aim to achieve; political ends, inter alia. However, the definition by Grob-Fitzgibbon 
                                                          
6 Findings are subsumed into two parts, those that relate to transnational sources of threats, and that of the 
domestic. Additionally, each part is analyzed and discussed 
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(2005) fills that vacuum. In addition to political terrorism, he identifies three forms namely 
revolutionary, reactionary and nationalistic terrorism. It could be observed that terrorism 
takes different forms and can be used for different purposes. 
However, despite the absence of a generally agreed definition, there are common 
definitional elements which feature a number of varied definitions. They include: the use 
of violence or threat of violence for political purposes (see Gibbs 1989; Hoffman 1999); 
religious, revolutionary, reactionary, and nationalistic reasons, as well as State and non-
state actors as perpetrators (see Grob-Frizgibbon 2005); a differentiation between the 
victim of an attack and the ultimate target that terrorists seek to influence (see Bergesen 
2007; Schmid 1982); and the indiscriminate targeting of civilians (see Goodwin 2006a). 
It could be argued that BH, which is a case study in this paper is religiously-inspired. They 
are therefore involved in religious terrorism explained as “the use of violence for religious 
means, to religiously convert or cleanse a people or nation, or to bring about revolutionary 
or reactionary religious change within a single state, region or continent” (Grob-Fitzgibbon 
2005). Nevertheless, it could also be observed that BH has political underpinnings which 
betray their political goals. As a result, the working definition of terrorism for purposes of 
this research covers all the common definitional elements highlighted above; except that it 
excludes State terrorism, and terrorism by lone wolves 7( That is terrorism perpetrated by 
States, and lone wolves are beyond the scope of this study. Nonetheless, the paper does not 
discount the fact that terrorism could also be pursued for socio-economic reasons 
(O’Connor 2014). 
Similarly, the scope of this paper is limited to domestic, and transnational terrorism, and 
the factors which trigger their causes. Domestic terrorism involves terrorist activities which 
take place within a country, or a localized area. Whilst transnational terrorism involves 
terrorist attacks and activities that transcend beyond national boundaries. Ewi (2013) 
captures the definition of transnational terrorism as a situation whereby “…an attack may 
                                                          
7 These are individual terrorists who prefer to act alone: Eg. Anders Breivik, and Timothy 
McVeigh. 
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be planned in country A and executed in country B, and materials for the attack may have 
come from countries C, D, E…” 
It also focuses on domestic causes in the sense that existing conditions within a State could 
degenerate into terrorism, and terrorist incidence. In the same vein, transnational8 causes 
of terrorism relate to factors that engender the transport of ideologies, and attacks beyond 
national borders.  
The study concerns both domestic, and transnational forms of terrorism because of the 
internal and external factors that give rise to terrorism. Despite their unique features, and 
factors that occasion them, domestic terrorism affects transnational terrorism in that the 
former seldom spills over to the latter (Enders et al. 2011). This partly underscores why 
potentially targeted countries may have to assist in combating home grown terrorism. 
Undoubtedly, these varying factors constitute threats, and offer a more nuanced and 
elaborate study of the threat than would otherwise have been the case if the focus had been 
on one type of the phenomenon. The literature on terrorism reveals that researchers have 
mostly focused on transnational terrorism than domestic terrorism (Botha 2008; Enders et 
al. 2011). Even in their elaborate study on the latter, researchers tend to ignore the root 
causes of domestic terror acts. Ironically, domestic terrorism poses a more direct threat to 
state security than transnational terrorism, yet it tends to be relegated to the background 
(Botha 2008; Enders et al. 2011).  
            2.2 Literature review 
With respect to Ghana, a number of research has been conducted on the country vis-à-vis 
violence. For instance,  (Aning & Abdallah 2013) extensive work have focused on Islamic 
radicalization and violence in Ghana. The findings of the study suggest that though Ghana 
suffers from a relative violence arising from religious radicalization, such violence are not 
directed against the state but targeted within, and among similar and different strands of 
religious groups. However, Sosuh (2011) research work on Border Security in Ghana: 
Challenges and Prospects, offers a more comprehensive study on the various cross border, 
and transnational organized crimes which feature terrorism, drug, arm, and human 
                                                          
8 It means extending or operating across national borders 
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trafficking, and a host of others. Without doubt, her research identified that Ghana was 
beset with a myriad of border security challenges, including transnational terrorism which 
threatens the security and stability of the country. Nevertheless, her limited focus on 
terrorism, in comparison to that of a more general focus on border security crimes could 
arguably have affected the scope, and volume of the findings in relation to the threat of 
terrorism. However, the fact that the phenomenon of terrorism is (sometimes) operated in 
tandem with the aforementioned cross border crimes undergirds the status quo. For 
example, terrorists in Africa have coalesced with al-Qaeda and others, including 
transnational criminal networks such as drug traffickers, arms smugglers and cigarette 
traffickers to execute their agendas (Ewi 2013). More so, Ewi and plessis (2012) argue that 
Ghana and Nigeria are among the few states which have specific anti-terrorism centers, at 
the height of growing terrorism. Nonetheless, (Hutchful 2007) contends the low profile and 
the dormancy of Ghana’s anti-terrorism arrangements.  
Arguably, the foregoing reveals a limited research bothering on Ghana, and the 
phenomenon of terrorism. And even the few that have attempted, have ignored an 
important research focus which spans the area of domestic terrorism. In terms of the 
transnational aspect of terrorism as it relates to Ghana, as much as Nigeria and BH, the 
following observations concerning the literature could be made; 
First,  (Oftedal 2013a; Oftedal 2013b) two scholarly works on BH, offer a unique source 
of insight into the domestic, and transnational activities and nature of the Islamist sect. 
Emile maintains that BH is putative for being among the world’s most active Islamist 
groups, and embodies some transnational, as well as a some domestic composition. As a 
result, she asserts that the sect must be regarded as a terrorist organization in between the 
two extremes. Her findings suggest that BH’s transnational aspects spans from areas of 
training, weapons and recruitment. Whilst, among other things, its restricted attacks 
against Nigeria predominantly defines its domestic aspect. To a great extent, Oftedal’s 
findings strengthen those of (Zenn 2012; Zenn 2013; Zenn 2015) in terms of the sect’s 
transnational aspect9. The group has evolved from a more locally-based Islamist group to 
                                                          
9 The transnational aspect of BH is arguably more relevant for this research than the its domestic aspect, hence the 
concentration on the former).  
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a transnational one10 (ibid.). The transnational aspect of BH stems from its ideology, and 
modus operandi premised on its quest for  a regional reach (Abdulai 2015; Connell 2012; 
Freeman 2012; Iaccino 2015; Kira 2011; Mantzikos 2010; Osumah 2013; Sergie & johnson 
2015; The Economist 2011; Zenn 2015). This is evidenced by its change of name to 
Islamist State West African Province, after its merger with ISIS; and its training, and 
support from AQIM, AQAP, and Al-Shabaab11 (ibid.).  If this observation is anything to 
go by, there could be little doubt that the threats it poses transcends beyond the borders of 
Nigeria. Against this background, the research question seeks to find answers in light of 
the sect’ activities, as well as the conditions that elicited it owing to the socio-politico-
economic, and religious structural characteristics shared between Ghana and Nigeria.  
Furthermore, to underscore the relevance of the juxtaposition, Ismail (2013) contends that 
the shared SPEAR attributes, in addition to similar structural problems fuel the contagion 
of violent radicalization among countries within the (sub) region. For example, he 
identifies the twin problems of poverty, and unemployment, in their mix with politically, 
and religiously discontented and alienated people as factors that could fuel violent 
radicalization of affected people. Additionally, Botha (2008) in her investigation of  the 
Challenges in understanding terrorism in Africa…, she uncovered that adverse SPEAR  
conditions in African countries amount to domestic and transnational terrorism. Like 
Ismail, Botha maintained that these conditions fuel radicalization, and ultimately culminate 
in terrorism when they are mostly tied with hostile environments of political, and social 
marginalization which tend to alienate victims. Other scholarly sources that are germane 
to the research, and would be consulted include (Agbiboa, D. 2013) which explores the 
typology of the group, its activities, and offers some solutions to the threat they emit, as 
well as (Osumah 2013) article on “BH insurgency in Northern Nigeria and the vicious cycle 
of internal insecurity” which expanciates on the ramifications of the group’s activities on 
Nigeria’s state security, among others.  
To a larger extent, the literature review reveals that a significant research gap exists 
regarding the phenomena of domestic, and transnational terrorism, in relation to Ghana. 
                                                          
10 See Iaccino 2015; Solomon 2012- on the transnational aspect of BH 
11 They are designated terrorist groups in the Islamic Maghreb, Arabian Peninsula, and Somalia, respectively 
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The observation underscores the fact that the few research that have been conducted in 
connection to the aforesaid phenomena have been general in scope12 or limited to a specific 
phenomenon13. Therefore, this research seeks to significantly bridge the gap that exists 
within the literature, and the entire field as they relate to Ghana.  
             2.3.0 Theories  
The theories that have been selected for this study have connections with the socio-
economic, political, and religious notions which inspire domestic, and transnational 
terrorism. In this regard, theoretical framework discusses how terrorism connects to 
poverty, state legitimacy, religion, and social movements. These theories shall be used to 
illuminate the extent to which Ghana is vulnerable to domestic terrorism. 
Additionally, contagion and diffusion, as well as social movement theories are useful for 
explaining transnational terrorism. 
2.3.1 Poverty as a catalyst for Terrorism 
In its most general sense, poverty is the lack of basic necessities of life such as food, 
clothing, shelter, etc. Valentine (1968) indicates that “the essence of poverty is inequality. 
In slightly different words, the basic meaning of poverty is Relative deprivation.” 
A considerable number of conflicts occur in poor countries than in rich countries (Gleditsch 
et al. 2002; Gleditsch 2012) Additionally, the degree of wealth and that of economic 
progress largely account for differences in support for political violence (MacCulloch 
2004). Other supporters of this position include (Collier & Hoeffler 2004; Fearon & Laitin 
2003) among others. However, poverty, and other socio-economic factors as causal factors 
of terrorism remain a thorny debate. Though these theories explain social and economic 
conditions that facilitate terrorism, they lack the ability to provide responses to the question 
of why some people or groups in the same structurally disadvantaged circumstances choose 
terrorism and others do not.  Better still, not all poor people engage in terrorism. Some rich 
people are equally engaged in the phenomenon. Osama Bin Laden, and Ayman Al-Zawiri 
                                                          
12 In terms of research on the subject covering a wider geographical area such as West Africa, and Africa and  in 
terms of  a more general research that incorporates terrorism into other transnational cross border crimes  ) 
13 In this sense, domestic or transnational terrorism explored unilaterally, or separately). 
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were rich and highly educated, yet they masterminded the -9/11 attacks. Similarly, Botha 
(2008 p. 38) asserts that the perpetrators of the 2003 Casablanca terrorist attacks were poor, 
as well as those engaged in similar attacks in the same country in 2007 were less endowed. 
It should however, be recognized that poverty, and other socio-economic factors do not 
necessarily lead to terrorism singlehandedly. Rather, when a considerable number of them 
exist in their mix, their tendency to influence people to engage in terrorism is higher. For 
instance, when unemployment, poverty, marginalization, and a wide gap exist between the 
few rich, and the poor majority, the less privileged may have a sense of hopelessness, and 
might feel that they have nothing to lose. In the face of mounting unfavorable political 
conditions, the situation may be worse since it may culminate in alienation, radicalization, 
and terrorism.  
In reference to the definition of poverty by Valentine (1968) it could be argued that Poverty 
as a phenomenon relates to all forms of under development, unemployment, relative 
deprivation, and economic inequality (see chapter 5 for explanations).  This is so because 
all these socio-economic factors tend to deprive the citizenry of their basic necessities. In 
this respect, the existence of any one of these factors, or a combination of them, in the 
midst of extreme views or violent ideology could generate tendencies which could have 
implications for political violence not limited to terrorism. 
    2.3.2 State Legitimacy and Terrorism 
State legitimacy entails how power is used, and accepted by the citizens (Gilley 2006). 
Generally, it concerns itself with a mass support for the state, and the acknowledgement of 
the nature of rule by its subjects as appropriate. Following the treaty of Westphalia in 1648, 
the study of the modern state system and civil violence are well illuminated by the theories 
of state legitimacy. Legitimacy hinges on state conventions, rules, and the quality of 
leadership shown by regimes (Forsythe 1993). A state could equally be considered 
legitimate if it has relevant, and credible political institutions (Lipset 1960).  However, a 
state without legitimacy becomes susceptible to collapse or overthrow (Gilley 2006; Lipset 
1960). 
17 
 
Lipset (1960) argues that domestic terrorism also arises when there is an anomaly with 
state legitimacy owing to unresolved hostilities. Additionally,  Gurr and Leggewie (1970) 
maintain that terrorists design their propaganda to reflect the wider political grievances of 
the citizenry to champion their interests. Conclusively,  Engene (1998) argues that no state 
is immune to terrorism; even in states which are not burdened with the problems of state 
legitimacy, domestic terrorism occasionally occur. His study also uncovers that threats 
from international terrorism may be directed at countries that nevertheless do not have state 
legitimacy problems as well. 
It could be observed that State legitimacy, and its implications for terrorism relates to 
political issues of incompetent governance, unreliable state institutions, and pervasive 
political corruption. Each of these cankers, or their combinations generate grievances 
among the citizenry which (could) give rise to civil strife, rebellion, and all forms of 
political violence, including terrorism. 
    2.4 Social Movement theory  
This is one of several theories that seeks to engage issues of (counter) terrorism, and 
radicalization   (Borum 2011; Dalgaard-Nielsen 2008; Gunning 2009). It helps explain 
how, and why groups and individuals in one part of the world are influenced by same on 
ideologies, etc. across the globe. 
A social movement constitutes efforts by groups of individuals, and or organizations who 
are united by similar grievances, and discontentment, inter alia, to challenge the status quo, 
in a bid to ensuring a political/social change, prevent, or undo same in society (Diani 2004; 
Kendall 2012; Snow et al. 2004; Tilly 1984b). Several theories account for the explanation 
of the emergence of social movements. However, this study is limited to the deprivation 
theory, structure strain theory and resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald 1977). 
2.4.1 Relative Deprivation Theory  
It states that people who feel relatively deprived compared to others, on the basis of money, 
etc.  join social movements to address their grievances (SeeBernstein & Crosby 1980 ).  
2.4.2 The structure strain theory  
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This theory asserts that existing social structures, and personal strains put pressure on 
individuals, and groups to engage in deviant/criminal behavior (Featherstone & Deflem 
2003). For example pressure on lower economic classes/short expectations of income, 
quality education, and occupation may inform decisions of individuals and groups to 
engage in any means necessary to meet their economic expectations (ibid.). 
2.4.3 Resource Mobilization Theory  
The resource mobilization theory is anchored on the acquisition of resources by members 
and the ability to use same for political, and social actions, owing to existing socio-political 
grievances  (Buechler 2000; Kendall 2012). 
Often, Social Movements have de jure and de facto members, making their appeal, and 
reach expansive. Following the shared sympathy, and support, (un) official members (may) 
put into practice the dictates of other members given the fact that followers feel their views 
are well represented in their cause. This is based on the fact that opposing political or social 
actions taking place in any part of a country, or beyond, could inform others within or 
without to act similarly. This originates from their shared predicament which reflects itself 
in forms such as socio-economic problems, punctuated with sympathy, and empathy, and 
the desire to address the situation. For instance, the activities of BH may be appealing to 
some people across the globe. These people who become non-official members of BH may 
be tempted to act in a manner which has semblance with the latter. In this way the theory 
is very important in this respect; the spread of ideologies of movements beyond national 
borders. Examples of Social Movements include Al-Qaeda, as well as the Muslim 
Brotherhood (Munson 2001). Beside the social movement theory are the contagion, and 
diffusion theories of terrorism (Crenshaw 1998). 
2.5 Contagion, and Diffusion Theories 
In its literal sense, contagion refers to the transmission of a disease by direct or 
indirect contact, or an influence that spreads rapidly (Merriam-Webster Inc. 2015a).  
Google (2015a)  also defines it as the communication of disease from one person or 
organism to another by close contact, or the spreading of a harmful idea or theory. 
Similarly, diffusion, inter alia, literally means the spreading of something more widely 
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(Google 2015b). The defined ‘objects’ above uniquely identify themselves with the spread 
of a phenomenon from one area and or entity to the other. For the purpose of this research, 
both theories concern themselves with the possible spread of a (violent/radical) ideology 
from an entity (BH, and others) to the Ghanaian civilian population, including those in the 
diaspora14. Also, contagion, and diffusion theories associate themselves with the “spread 
of radical ideas and ideals, and movements and [their accompanying] government 
responses and policies [to them] (Ismail 2013 p. 247). Such theories are particularly 
important for illuminating interactions, exchanges, and influence which take place among 
terrorists. For example, the perpetration of attacks by one terrorist group may occasion or 
accompany that of others (Weimann & Brosius 1988), though terrorist attacks may not 
necessarily follow consistent periodic timelines, and may vary from time to time (Bjørgo 
2004; Midlarsky et al. 1980; Weimann & Brosius 1988). These simultaneous attacks  are 
partly enhanced by the publicity and media coverage given to (successful) terrorist 
incidences which partly inform decisions of other terrorists to undertake similar attacks 
elsewhere (Crenshaw 1998; Weimann & Brosius 1988). This scenario could be illustrated 
by the upsurge in BH attacks in Nigeria, following same by ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and Libya. 
Furthermore, the latter requested an alliance with the former at the height of their attacks. 
And there were situations where some unidentified suicide bombers had acted in Nigeria 
in their acclaimed support for ISIS. Additionally, terrorists held hostage, some Australians 
in a Sydney café as part of their support for ISIS. 
Moreover, Crenshaw (1998) asserts that terrorists learn from successes and setbacks 
recorded not only by themselves but by their counterparts as well. This phenomenon 
partially explains why a terrorist group like BH has evolved from a relatively low-level, 
locally-focused Islamist sect to a higher-level, nationally-focused, cum an internationally 
fledging terrorist group. The sect’s initial use of less dangerous equipment like knives, 
bows and arrows relatively hindered their quest to inflict more casualties on their victims. 
But their acquaintance, exposure, and apprenticeship with other terrorist groups, as well as 
other factors have occasioned their sophisticated evolution. 
                                                          
14 Potential terrorists – because some may succumb to the influence) 
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From the foregoing, it is clear that the influence of terrorist groups, and their interactions 
among one another sometimes sees no boundaries, despite their different geographical 
locations, and its concomitant barriers. Consequently, it could not be any exaggeration that 
the above scenarios underscore the possibilities of spread of violent and radical ideologies 
among terrorists. 
Nevertheless, these phenomena may not be limited to terrorists. There is the possibility that 
terrorists, and their activities may influence (unsuspecting) civilians which tend to be 
potential terrorists. It is also a fact that terrorists are keen on spreading their ideologies 
across through recruitments, and other media which makes each and every one a potential 
victim of their machinations. This possibility which is further undergirded by globalization, 
and the upsurge of the print, electronic, and other social networking platforms. 
            3.0 Chapter Three – Background 
3.1The Emergence, and evolution of BH  
BH is a Hausa Language which literally means Western Education is forbidden. However, 
officially, it is known as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunna Lidda'awati wal-Jihad, which in Arabic 
means "People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet's Teachings and Jihad". It is 
believed to have been formed in 2002, and radicalized in 2009 (BBC 2011).  The group is 
opposed to Western education /civilization15 and its engaged in strings of insurgency 
attacks  to topple the Nigerian government and replace same with Sharia-based rule, 
following allegations of bribery and corruption, unemployment, and other socio-politico-
economic situations that have resulted in endemic poverty, especially at the northern part 
of the country (BBC 2011; Walker 2012). The Islamist sect is also of the conviction that 
western civilization such as democracy, formal education, banking, inter alia, have 
undermined, and adulterated the  Islamic, and Nigerian cultural values, deepened the woes 
of the Nigerian people by exacerbating poverty, and had interfered in the affairs of same, 
in favor of ‘western powers’.  
The narratives of the sect’s emergence, and consequent radical evolution is shrouded in 
controversies. It is believed that the group used to be peaceful until it suffered brutalities 
                                                          
15 Or in a broader sense western civilization  
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in the hands of the Nigerian Police and the Military  (Madike 2011; Osumah 2013). The 
clash led to the arrest, and subsequent deaths of its members, notable among them was their 
leader, Abubakar Yusuf. Therefore, vengeance on behalf of its late leader is part of their 
strings of horrendous insurgency (Adibe 2012; Agbiboa, D. 2013; Agbiboa, D. E. 2013; 
Madike 2011).  
Yet other conditions are deemed to be partly accountable to its growth. They are socio-
politico-economic, and religious in nature and include the following;  
Poverty, (Adibe 2012; Agbaegbu 2012; Osumah 2013),  Poor governance and the general 
lack of credible institutions (Adibe 2012; Gourley 2012; Osumah 2013), Corruption (Adibe 
2012; Agbiboa, D. E. 2013; Oftedal 2013a; Osumah 2013), Unemployment (Adibe 2012; 
Agbaegbu 2012; Agbiboa, D. E. 2013; Nwachuckwu 2011; Osumah 2013), 
Political and Religious Factors 
Though little is known about the financial sources of the group, it is believed that some 
political, and religious leaders, cum charity-based groups in the Gulf provide support to 
the group (Adesoji 2010 p. 101).  Also striking are issues of politico-ethnic, and religious 
tensions, and disputes owing to Britain’s ‘artificial’ demarcation of the Nigerian state. 
3.2 Ghana’s current measures regarding threats posed by BH and other Islamist 
Groups 
Ghana has legal, and institutional arrangements which have been established to address 
terrorism and other transnational organized crimes. It prides itself with institutions such as 
Counter terrorism, intelligence, Police, Military, Ghana Immigration Service (GIS), the 
Customs Excise and Preventive Service (CEPS), the Police, tthe Airforce, Navy, and the 
Army.  
In terms of anti-terrorism, Ghana has domestic legislative instruments, and frameworks 
which include but not limited to Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Act, 2012, Act 842, Anti-
Terrorism Act 2008 (Act 762), anti-money laundering Act 2008, Act 749, Economics and 
Organized Crime Act 2010 Act 804, the Directive principle of State policy, and 1992 
Constitution. Also, at the (sub) regional, and international levels, it has ratified a number 
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of conventions, and protocols on terrorism. For example, it has ratified the ECOWAS’ 
Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters, Convention on Extradition, 
Convention on Small Arms and Light Weapons (mutual 2013; extradition 2013; small arms 
2013) and Algiers Protocol on Conflict Prevention (ECOWAS 1999 – Protocol relation 
to), Similarly, it is a signatory to the 1999 OAU Convention on the Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, and Protocol to the 1999 OAU Convention (Africa Union 2004 
– Protocol to the OAU C; Africa Union 2013 – list of countries who have ratified) at the 
regional level.  
Ghana is engaged in a number of activities at the (sub) regional, and international levels in 
addressing issues of security, and stability. As a first step, it has, for instance, ratified, and 
signed treaties, protocols and conventions bothering on terrorism, convention on mutual 
assistance in criminal matters, the Algiers protocol on conflict prevention, and the 1999 
OAU/AU protocol on conflict prevention (African Union 2004; African Union 2013; 
ECOWAS 2013a; ECOWAS 2013b). This means that Ghana is historically involved in a 
joint cooperation, and collaboration with ECOWAS, and AU member States in curbing the 
menace of terrorism. It also commits troops to these organizations for peace keeping, and 
peace enforcement missions as noted in Mali, Somalia, and others. 
In Ghana, terrorism was first criminalized under the Criminal Offences Act of 1960 (Act 
29). Hijacking and attack on international communications are considered criminal. 
Presently, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 2008 addresses much wider issues which include 
provisions for the confiscation and repatriation of terrorist funds and assets. 
With specific reference to the current BH issue, the already existing structures between 
Ghana and Nigeria have been stepped up to facilitate the sharing of intelligence, expertise, 
and resources to fight BH, and other terrorist groups in the region. Additionally, the 
Ghanaian president and ECOWAS Chair, is already involved in efforts by way of soliciting 
support from (sub) regional, continental, and international communities with the view to 
dealing with the menace (Deutsche Welle 2015; myjoyonline.com 2015; Tornyi 2015).  
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3.3. Religious Radicalizatin (R.R) and violence in Ghana 
R.R in Ghana is mainly intra religious, but has also inter religious components (Aning & 
Abdallah 2013). That is it takes place more within different strands or sects of the same 
religion, than against opposition to other religious traditions. However, religious 
radicalization within Islam is relatively rampant than the rest. Aning and Abdallah (2013 
p. 102) identify three major radical Islamic religious groups in Ghana which include the 
Tijaniyya/Sufists movement, Ahlussunna Waljama’a /Wahhabists, and the Qadyani sect of 
the Ahmaddiyya Movement . They observe that all agree to the core beliefs of Islam, except 
that they differ in their approaches. Their different approach reflect the varied 
interpretations, and applications of their religious texts and teachings. This accounts for 
situations giving rise to more radicalized sects, whilst others remain none, or less 
radicalized. Their different approaches are very important in understanding radicalism, and 
its concomitant violence among the religious groups in Ghana. This is because those that 
are extremists/radicalized have hostile approach to the moderate Islamic sects, and non-
Islamic religious groups. For example, the modus operandi of the Ahlussunna Waljama’a 
sect is characterized by vituperations, verbal, and physical attacks (p. 106). This generates 
hostilities between the moderate Tijaniyyas, and other non-Islamic religious groups (ibid. 
p. 105).  However, though radicalization is much identified with the Ahlussunna sect, the 
Tijanniya sect are seldom involved (Aning and Abdallah, p. 107).  
In terms of Christianity, its denominations include the orthodox, charismatic, and 
Protestants. Like Islam, the Christian sects in Ghana share similar beliefs in the core tenets 
of Christian religious doctrine which is premised on the existence of the Almighty God. 
However, their points of departure lie at the heart of their names; orthodox – old practice; 
charismatic – strong belief in Jesus Christ and his doctrine, and characterized by their 
revivalism following the baptism of the Holy Spirit; and last but not least, Protestant- the 
breakaway faction of the orthodox sect. The phenomenon of radicalization within these 
groups is nil or almost non-existing. This accounts for their relatively general peaceful 
relationships. Also, they have no known records of violence against non-Christian religious 
groups.   
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Last but not least, Ghana has adherents of the traditional religion. Like their Islamic and 
Christian counterparts, traditional worshippers believe in the existence of the Almighty 
God, but worship him via ‘smaller gods’. Additionally, they do not have any major 
confrontational records with the rest of the religious groups, except some few instances of 
disagreements over their ban on noise making in observing their annual traditional festival, 
which culminated in some pockets of violence.  However, they have no known history of 
radicalization in Ghana.  
Generally, radicalization in Ghana occasionally culminate in pockets of violence, and 
conflicts. Nonetheless, such violence relatively occur on a smaller scale compared to those 
in other parts of the sub region. For example, the Ahmadiyyas and the mainstream Muslims 
engaged in skirmishes in the 1930’s; In the late 1990’s, clashes ensued between the 
Ahlussunna Waljama’a and the Tijaniyya Islam movements on one hand, and Ahmadiyya 
Muslim movement on the other hand (Terdman 2007). Tsikata and Seini (2004) give a 
detailed account of intra religious confrontations among Muslim sects.  
Whilst there have been recorded incidents of religious violence between Muslims and 
Christians, such incidents are relatively on the low. Tsikata and Seini (2004 p. 26) reveal 
that at a time “when all the intra-Muslim disputes were reported, there were no reports of 
violence between Muslims and Christians. Rather, a religious conflict which has seen much 
reportage and controversy is “between the traditional religious authorities of the Ga 
Traditional State and Christian churches” For instance, the 1998/9 ban on drumming 
instigated by the Ga traditionalists was met with opposition from some Christian churches. 
Whilst silence is an essential feature, and observation of the former’s annual traditional 
celebration, the contrary was true for the latter. Hence, the volatile situation escalated into 
violence, and recorded some attacks (All Africa 1998; Tsikata & Seini 2004).  
Last but not least, some Islamic and Christian groups in Ghana receive funding from 
external sources. Some sources include States, individuals, and organizations. Their 
support have been direct or indirect.  Religious-based institutions such as universities, 
hospitals, and NGO’s are evidence of external support. Whilst such philanthropic acts may 
be informed by good cause, they are equally a means of influencing (potential) 
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beneficiaries to succumb to certain ideologies, practices, and beliefs which (may) have 
implications for the State. 
3.3.1Ghana’s policy on religious radicalization  
Ghana has no specific law (s) instituted to check radicalization. However, it has legal 
frameworks that bind religious adherents and their conducts. The 1992 Constitution of 
Ghana notably serves as an important source of recognition of religious rights and freedoms 
of the Ghana citizenry.  Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 117) indicate that the government 
does not often institute legal proceedings against culpable elements of religiously-inspired 
attacks for fear of escalation. However, it explores options to curb the occurrence of 
radicalization, which take the form of a ‘multi-denominational’ approach (ibid.). 
4.0 Chapter Four - Methods and Methodology  
Under this heading, I concisely highlight the data collection methods, and bring to fore, the 
reasons informing their choice. Subsequently, issues pertaining to data collection 
materials, methods used in the data collection, respondents, reliability, validity, and ethical 
considerations, as well as limitations are explored. 
4.1 Methods of data collection 
This paper involves the conduct of a face-to-face interview, and analyses of contents of 
material sources via a qualitative-based research approach. As a consequence, it explored 
both primary and secondary sources of data for purposes of augmentation, and 
triangulation. In this respect, face-to-face interviews constituted primary sources, whilst 
Information from scholarly articles, books, and newspaper sources formed the secondary 
sources. 
The primary sources were based on semi standardized (semi-structured) interviews, whilst 
literature studies constituted a chunk of the secondary data sources. The semi-standardized 
interviewees, and the literature studies particularly focused on Ghana, and Nigeria, 
respectively; though literature studies intersected the two approaches given the fact that 
data obtained from the primary sources were scanty; and not least, the need for 
triangulation. 
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Like any research, literature studies ushered in the thesis by providing pertinent 
background information to the topic. For example, data from sources such as books, and 
websites facilitated access to preliminary information on BH, and Ghana. This was very 
helpful in commencing the research since it provided a general overview. More 
importantly, the use of literature studies was material in that it provided not only 
preliminary data, but comprehensive information which were used in tandem with the 
semi-standardized interviews. Information, and intelligence on BH is very much 
confidential, and therefore restricted to public access. However, the literature survey is 
based on open sources. Though terrorist attacks such as the -9/11 has elicited a surge in 
academic research on terrorism and radicalization, they are arguably focused on the Middle 
East, and the Arab world. In relative terms, a few have written about the subject of BH in 
Nigeria in academic circles. As a result, Nigerian national newspapers, and other 
international media provide invaluable sources of information on BH especially on events 
that have wider international connections. Some notable media in this respect include the 
Vanguard, the Daily Mail, BBC, CNN, and Al Jazeera, to mention a few. Nevertheless, 
these sources come with their weaknesses. For instance, information posted on websites by 
BH have been drafted in propaganda rhetoric to score political points. Additionally, given 
the fact that most press in Nigeria are based in southern Nigeria, there is the tendency that 
journalists who report on the northern-based insurgency could be biased, Campbell cited 
in (Oftedal 2013b). This also arises partly because of threats directed at journalists by the 
sect (ibid.). These developments tend to affect the quality of information on the group, vis-
à-vis electronic media. To compensate for this, I consulted secondary sources such as peer-
articles and books. Moreover, given the limited availability of these sources on information 
that bothered on relevant aspects of my research as they related to Ghana, semi 
standardized interviews were conducted in the latter.  
Semi-standardized interviews involve questions that bother on broad range of issues, and 
do not necessarily follow any strict sequence (Berg & Lune 2012; Bryman 2008). The 
selection of the Semi standardized interview type, among other alternatives such as 
standardized interview; and the unstructured interviews  (Berg & Lune 2012) was based 
on its relative suitability to the study over the others. In terms of standardized interviews, 
semi standardized interviews are more flexible as their open-ended questions allowed me 
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to probe further on crucial issues raised by respondents (ibid.). This was useful since it 
enabled me to obtain comprehensive information I required.  
Moreover, the semi standardized interview which was conducted on one-to-one basis 
largely helped the respondents to possibly provide their responses with ease. 
The choice also helped to avoid disruption and cut-ins from other interviewees. This was 
very critical in my quest for in-depth, and clear responses from the interviewees which 
would have been relatively difficult to achieve in the case of one-to-many type of 
interviewees. 
Last but not least, the face-to-face dialogue occasioned by the semi standardized interview 
helped establish rapport between the interviewer, and the interviewee (Leech 2002).  This 
was also against the backdrop that interviewees were related to as people and not merely 
as sources of data (Taylor & Bogdan 1998). This form of “social interaction” offered me 
the opportunity to see the body language, gestures, and cues of interviewees which were 
essential for understanding the quality of their responses. This enabled me to better 
understand what they said, how they said it and what they meant (Taylor & Bogdan 1998). 
In all, about twenty one people were interviewed. They comprised the Police, Military, 
intelligence official, Security analysts, bureaucrat (at Ghana’s Ministry of Interior, and 
Foreign Affairs), the immigration, custom, government officials, researchers, and Students. 
Most of these interviewees had in depth knowledge about counter terrorism, security, and 
events in Ghana, Nigeria, and the entire African region. Also, they had fairly followed 
security-related events revolving round Ghana, Nigeria, and BH over time.  
In this study, a non- probability sampling strategy was chosen to avoid basing the sample 
selection on probability theory (ibid.) as characterized by qualitative research. As noted by 
(Berg & Lune 2012), non-probability sampling is appropriate for the kind of qualitative 
data needs that concern the social sciences. The research question seek to enquire about the 
phenomena of terrorism, and its associated threats as it relates to BH and Ghana. The study 
therefore sought to describe, analyze, discuss, and interpret meanings, and perceptions of 
interviewees. The choice of non-probability method of convenience sampling was 
informed by the fact that it is inexpensive, quick, and easily facilitates access to informants 
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(Berg & Lune 2012 p. 32). More importantly is the fact that it is the most appropriate for 
the study. Besides, the choice was made because I needed interviewees with relevant 
expertise (ibid.). Additionally, it could be argued that the selected sampling method had 
some elements which are symptomatic of purposive sampling in that my “special 
knowledge or expertise” dictated the choice of the selected informants. Though I 
acknowledge that researchers occasionally use purposive sampling because of its “lack of 
wide generalizability” which is an acute limitation (Berg & Lune 2012 p. 32).  I contend 
that the chosen sampling method is mainly convenience. 
4.2 Data Collection Materials 
With regards to the material for the collection of data, I considered various kinds and settled 
on the type that could be most suitable for the study. Apparently, note taking, audio, and 
video recording are some of the approaches available to researchers in the conduct of their 
interviews. Therefore, the identification of the merits and demerits of each material dictated 
the choice I perceived to be most appropriate; Note-taking, is often slow, distractive, and 
inimically affects understanding, accurate quotations, and uninterrupted flow of interview 
(Crang & Cook 2007).  Video cameras present their own challenges; they create discomfort 
to the respondents and thus affect how much information they put out, to mention a few.  
Like the video cameras, tape-recorders hinder and restrict respondents on the amount of 
information they should give. Ultimately, tape-recorder was used for the interview with 
the informed consent of respondents. This was to avoid the ramifications (Berg & Lune 
2012) air when research ethics are violated. 
4.3Ethical Considerations 
In terms of ethical considerations, a lot of attempts were made to adhere to them since it is 
incumbent on every researcher to do so. 
All but two scheduled interviews took place as arranged. Though there were few instances 
where I had to reschedule because of time constraints, differences in schedules and other 
factors. I did not provide the prospective informants with a consent form. However, during 
my arrangements with them which was prior to the interview, they consented to grant me 
audience, hence implied consent (Berg & Lune 2012p. 92).  Though implied consent may 
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not have been the better option, perhaps it helped to avoid disclosing (all the) important 
research questions which is a limitation associated with informed consent. However, since 
getting informed consent is an important ethical phenomenon in research, it is always better 
to adhere to it. In this respect, if the interviews were to be re conducted, an explicit consent 
of prospective interviewees would be sought via the provision of a consent statement form 
to make it more formal, organized, and referential. 
Nevertheless, issues bothering on privacy, confidentiality, anonymity and responses were 
discussed with the informants. Two of the respondents were anonymized owing to security 
reasons. Since they work within the security and the custom units, they were accordingly 
anonymized as Security Analyst, and Custom Official, respectively. Appendix 2 provides 
relevant information regarding the date, designations, names and place of respondents.  As 
a result, identities of some informants have been protected, and other related demands of 
informants adhered to. An informed consent was sought from all interviewees to avoid 
flouting on their rights.  
4.4Limitations and Constraints  
As with any research, this study was conducted with pertinent limitations. Some of which 
were anticipated prior to its commencement. Firstly, security challenges and concerns 
apparently made it difficult to conduct interviews in northern Nigeria which has seen much 
of BH activities.  
Additionally, the controversy surrounding the definition of terrorism is an important source 
of worry vis-à-vis the subject under discussion. Since there is currently no agreed and 
definite meaning of the term, it makes for open and subjective interpretations by different 
actors and stakeholders. 
Moreover, since the topic bothers on intelligence and sensitive National security issues 
obtaining relevant data from the security agencies was a bit difficult. Security and other 
intelligence agencies reluctantly released information for national security concerns. 
Understandably, this has been the practice and convention. 
Furthermore, some scheduled interviews could not materialize due to certain factors 
beyond the control of the interviewer, and the interviewee. The interview with the Nigerian 
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High Commissioner to Ghana was fruitless owing to time constraints, and his consequent 
unavailability at the time the interview was expected to take place. Similarly, the futile 
interview with the academic was on grounds of ethics owing to my inadvertent failure to 
furnish her with my University’s ethical guidelines on interviews. 
Last but not least is the issue of inadequate funding of the research. As a Self-financing 
student, I perceived difficulty in financing the cost associated with the research. The 
success of this research was partly dependent on the acquisition of resource and financial 
needs. However, per my budget, travelling to Nigeria and Ghana required a considerable 
amount of financial resources, even far beyond the frugal funding offered by my university. 
To this end, the acquisition of additional funds could have probably given the research a 
different boost. Having said that, generally, the research was carried out with the limited 
funding, and was brought to a successful end. 
Notwithstanding the above challenges, there were some corresponding remedies that were 
identified. They are listed below; 
Firstly, since the research concerned Nigeria and Ghana, it would have been appropriate to 
conduct the research in both countries. However, the research was conducted in the latter 
country given the insecurity in the northern part of Nigeria. The deficit was therefore 
compensated for by interviewing people in Ghana, whose expertise fall within the purview 
the topic. It could however be argued that the overall data derived from the respondents in 
Ghana constitute primary data. 
Nevertheless, the data collection constitute primary and secondary sources. In this way, the 
data derived from these sources were complementary, and offered much more information 
which would otherwise not have been possible if only one source was used.   
More so, in terms of the constraints regarding the difficulty on the part of security officials 
to release information that had repercussions for the nation’s security, attempts were made 
to assess relevant data to the extent possible and permissible. For example, I probed further 
to seek clarification when the occasion demanded it. In this way, the semi standardized 
interview helped in this regard.  
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Moreover, the acquisition of relevant data from my respondents was enhanced by the 
support I received from my University through the latter’s official correspondence and 
protocols.  
Also, as it may be evident that the controversy surrounding the definition of terrorism, with 
its resultant difficulties, is a source of worry in research pertaining to the phenomenon.  
Nonetheless, the difficulty was addressed by a choice which contains a considerable 
number of common definitional elements of terrorism. In addition, it was conceptualized 
to elicit a shared understanding.    
Furthermore, the failed interview attempts with the two aforementioned people did not 
largely affect the study. This is anchored on the argument that the situation was anticipated, 
hence adequate preparation was made to curtail it.  For example, the sampling size of 
twenty one respondents was enough compensation for the situation. 
Last but not least, is the issue of funding. I am grateful to my University for partly funding 
the research to the tune of eight thousand kroner .This amount undoubtedly assisted at great 
length in affecting the success of the research. The inadequacy of the funding required 
effective financial management, and applications to other sources for funding. In these 
ways, the problem of financial difficulties was partially dealt with. 
4.5 Respondents 
I identified my respondents in four ways. First, selection was based on the authorship of 
the literature. Second, I had prior knowledge of the expertise of some of the respondents in 
relation to the topic. In addition to this, I visited the websites of some of the  institutions 
with relevance for  my research, such as the University of Ghana, and that of the Kofi 
Annan International Peacekeeping and Training Center (KAIPTC), to mention a few.  
And last but not least, I relied on personal contacts of some of the earlier respondents for 
contacts of other potential respondents. I did this by the snowball method. Aware of the 
bias involved in the use of the snowball method owing to the fact that respondents may 
direct a researcher to colleagues with similar views and background as their own  (Tansey 
2007), I tried to limit that tendency by widening the number of my potential interviewees, 
as well as reducing the number of recommended or referred respondents. In effect, I had 
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few respondents who were referred to me. This might have helped largely to reduce 
incidence of bias.  
In view of the need to execute the interview on time , I scheduled appointments with some 
of my would-be interviewees informing them beforehand via email, on my quest to 
interview them. However, some could not respond due to defunct emails. Nevertheless, 
upon my arrival in Ghana, I was able to schedule new and further appointments which saw 
all but two successful interviews.  
4.6 Reliability 
If a measure produces the same results under the same conditions, there is research 
reliability. It also entails how precise and replicable a study is when repeated time and 
again. The phenomenon is also linked to the credence a researcher could associate to a 
measuring instrument to produce the same results when the measurement is repeated on 
the same instrument of measure (King et al. 1994).  It also goes beyond this “measurement” 
to include how the data “were created”, collected, “possessed”, and used (ibid.).   
I opted for semi-standardized interview since I felt was the most appropriate choice for the 
study. This type of interview falls between the two extremes, and bridges the gap of the 
“flexibility” ‘problem’, needed for a more reliable research finding. It also has the merit of 
facilitating opportunity to compare various responses from a set of standardized questions, 
though it partly requires the researcher’s discretion to influence the flow of the interview 
(Bryman 2008). Although its reliability is relatively low compared to standardized 
interviews, the semi-standardized interview chosen was consistent with the purpose of my 
research, hence most suitable for same. 
Additionally, given the fact that reliability concerns itself with the creation, collection, 
interpretation, and usage of data, I have provided comprehensive information to that effect. 
This would also make it plausible for other researchers to conduct assessment of the 
methods and methodologies, as well as interpretations I employed in the research. The 
result of which (may) partly strengthens the reliability of my study (King et al. 1994). 
Nonetheless, the possibility to reproduce the study, and its findings is mitigated/hampered 
by the fact that one of my respondents was anonymized.  
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Crucially, and cautiously assessing the contents of the data collected adds to the research’s 
reliability. This is against the backdrop that possibility exists on the part of (some) 
respondents to skew their responses in order to gain some advantage or advance their 
interests. For example, in soliciting his views on what he thought of the degree of Ghana’s 
counter-terrorism preparedness for an eventual terror attack within and without its borders, 
Aning asserted that “if you could talk to the intelligence, and the police, they will say ‘oh 
yes, yes’ [we are prepared] but you know, if there is a bomb at Accra Mall, or even not a 
bomb, something that goes out from a car, and somebody is hurt, how do you evacuate 
such a place?...In the nutshell, the respondent indicated that some key stakeholders may 
not provide credible and reliable information to my research questions. This means that 
respondents may not recognize the impact of their responses to a research question.  
In terms of news reportage, some journalists hardly fulfill the requirement of good 
journalistic practices. This tends to affect the quality of their reportage.  
In the face of these challenges, I have cross-checked multiple sources of information, and 
employed methods to triangulate the findings of the research. For instance, I did not spare 
the efforts of conducting comparisons, and contrasts of data obtained among my diverse 
primary, and secondary sources with a view to ascertaining the reliability of the whole 
research. However, the covet nature of intelligence, and counter terrorism operations, 
punctuated with the dynamism, and propaganda of  BH means that some of the materials 
may be undeniably arduous to substantiate and therefore remain unclear despite vigorously 
resorting to multiplicity of sources, and methods. 
      4.7 Validity 
Research Validity deals with accurate, and appropriate choice of concepts, the consistency 
with which concepts are operationalized, and the measurement of the right research 
variables. 
Concept validity deals with appropriate measurement of the intended object of 
measurement/variables. A high concept validity means that operationalized variables 
encompasses all relevant areas of the concepts used in the research. For example, in my 
study I sought to find out how the emergence of BH, and the current socio-politico-
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economic, and religious conditions in Ghana affects Ghana’s vulnerability to the threats of 
terrorism. In the study, much efforts were cautiously channeled into meticulously 
measuring the operationalized term of threats, via in depth identification of varying views 
of respondents, and other secondary sources, cum methods. It could be argued that since 
semi-standardized interviews allows for higher concept validity than standardized 
interviews given the latter’s merit of higher flexibility which allows for further probing of 
questions, it was appropriate to have resorted to its use. However, such position is 
contestable given the fact that the semi-standardized interviews entails a somewhat 
opportunity of flexibility which has semblance to the standardized version, and therefore 
not so much difference is made regarding the efficacy of its concept validity. 
 
5.0 Chapter Five – Empirical Findings 
Main Research Question - To what extent is Ghana vulnerable to the threat of 
terrorism? 
In this Chapter, I shall analyze and discuss the various responses from interviewees on how 
their perspectives on the rise of BH, and the socio-politico-economic, and religious 
conditions in Ghana affect the possibilities for domestic and transnational terrorism in 
Ghana. This is to find possible answers to the overarching question of the extent to which 
Ghana is vulnerable to the threats of domestic and transnational terrorism. In order to do 
this, I shall use the Social Movement Theory which is a useful tool to unearthing, and 
facilitating understanding of possibilities of the spread of transnational terrorism beyond 
national borders. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, are the usefulness of the 
transnational theories of contagious, and diffusion in this regard. And they would be 
employed accordingly to achieve this aim. 
After considering perspectives on transnational terrorism, I shall turn to how the current 
socio-politico-economic, and religious conditions in Ghana affects its prospects for 
domestic terrorism. With respect to domestic terrorism, the appropriate theoretical tool that 
would be employed would be the social Movement theory which constitutes deprivation, 
structural strain and the resource mobilization theories. 
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In an attempt to find answers to the above research question, the following responses were 
received. They are found below; 
According to Mr. Alex Adu, an Assistant Comptroller of the Ghana immigration service, 
the BH crisis, and threat has the tendency to affect the immediate and distant neighbors of 
Nigeria; He said the menace “may spread to Ghana”, and other areas of the region given 
the porosity of the Ghana, and the West African borders. 
For Mr. Elvis Kwakye Oliver of the University of natural sciences, the transnational nature 
of BH posed existential threat to Ghana, since the sect seems to be a network of terrorist 
group that do not occupy only Nigeria. He argued that there was a tendency for them to 
infiltrate Ghana as well. 
Like the positions of the above interviewees, Ms. Emefa Debrie was of the opinion that 
Ghana is not immune to the crisis in neighboring Nigeria. To her, “…Ghana should be 
concerned probably for her security because if it is happening there, then it is likely it could 
happen here [Ghana] too… 
For Ms. Selina Wini, her skeptical concern over the security of the Ghana borders, among 
others, informed her assertion that Ghana must up her game to avoid a similar situation; 
She argued that once Ghana’s borders, and security checks are weak, one must not 
downplay the possibility of the BH infiltration in the country, given the fact that terrorism 
is transportable, and extendable. Additionally, she said members of the sect could disguise 
themselves as refugees and penetrate the Ghanaian terrain when the crisis escalate. 
According to a senior official of the Ghana Customs Office, the activities of BH threaten 
the security of the region, and the globe”. He argued among other things that “…once it 
[terrorism] has happened in Nigeria, and Ghana and Nigeria are Anglophone countries 
colonized by the British and then looking at the social structure almost the same, it’s likely 
Ghana too may one day fall into the same crisis …” 
Furthermore, a security analyst with one of Ghana’s National Security agencies had this to 
say when asked about the rise of BH, and its implications for Ghana; 
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“… [I am] aware that the activities of BH have spread into Chad, Cameroon, and I believe 
could lead to other adjoining areas. If you look at the relationship between Ghana and 
Nigeria, there is nothing that happens in Nigeria and it didn’t show some signs in Ghana. 
Because when ‘419’ began as an economic cybercrime, it was a Nigerian issue. Now, there 
are Ghanaians who are almost surpassing Nigerians in the business. Because they have 
associates…, If you come to other activities in the oil industry, even music and culture, 
showbiz, there is a lot of linkage and co-influence between Ghana and Nigeria. Even 
religion. I was surprised when somebody told me that a Ghanaian was a Sharia Supreme 
Court judge in Northern Nigeria. A Ghanaian, born and bred, educated in Ghana, moved 
to resettle in Nigeria, and has become a member of the sharia Supreme Court judges in 
Nigeria.  He comes for holidays, he shares ideas with people. He has brothers here [Ghana].  
They pay him visits. They get educated there. What is the likelihood that they will not 
transport such ideas to Ghana? The security analyst also highlighted the socio-economic 
conditions in Ghana; 
“…economically we are suffering. And you cannot analyze security without talking 
economics. Why am I saying so? If your economy is failing, you are failing to meet your 
social responsibilities to your electorates. You cannot give them economic goods for which 
they voted you into power. And once your economy is failing, you are going to have 
internal crisis, agitations, and these are all internal security problems. You can even think 
about our ‘power crisis’16. We depended a lot on Nigeria for power [but] because of the 
BH activities, we are not getting the needed gas to fire our thermal plants. And for that 
matter our industries cannot work. Domestic consumers who need power cannot get it, 
political agitations are arising, and what else can you call it insecurity? When your people 
are not satisfied and are questioning whether you are even governing properly, whether 
you are taking good care of them. It is not only when you have guns shooting at you that 
you are insecure. . Even when the people you are governing are not satisfied and are even 
threatening to vote you out of power, where lies security? So economically, if the activities 
create a situation where it cannot let you meet your goals and governance, then you are 
unsecured. Apart from that, the overflow of violence which can happen. Even if it is 
                                                          
16 Shortage of hydro-electric power which has led to ‘power’ rationing, and intermittent power supply 
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refugees coming into your country alone, the refugees are of different shades and color. 
They come in and are going to be dependent on you. You have extra things to take care of. 
And supposing they don’t get confined and they go to practice some of the negative things 
that they use practicing in their country, it happened to us when we had Liberian refugees 
in Ghana. You go to the central region, crime rate increased, some of them even managed 
to come down with weapons, and then they were doing their own things. So it has a lot of 
implications because the West African sub-region is inter-twined in a certain way. Ghana 
is blessed that we have a lot of accommodating, sober citizenry but this continual 
interaction with some of these kind of inflow of refugees can change the character of 
Ghanaians. If you look at even prostitution, it used not to be as prevalent as it is now 
because of the influence of Nigerian prostitutes, a lot of Ghanaians have joined them and 
we have that development taking a different dimension. So in so far as we keep interacting, 
there is a kind of cross-cultural development. The negative, the positive, which come to 
interplay and that itself, cannot guarantee that we can continue to be what we were. So that 
is not security. 
Nonetheless, despite his perceived threats of the group, he was quick to add that Ghana has 
no cause to worry so much owing to ongoing security and intelligence gathering among 
West African countries through the ‘ECOWAS framework’; coupled with the distant 
proximity of Ghana to Nigeria, and the nature of Ghanaians to report strange characters; 
He said they were doing their best, and cooperating with other (sub) regional stakeholders 
to deal with the situation. 
There is West African union of intelligence organization. They share intelligence 
…and information, so we are trying to see how we work towards this. It’s even 
within the ECOWAS policy framework and to a large extent I can say that it has 
been very successful. But I still see BH as a localized problem for Nigeria. Forget 
about the spillover effect so far in Cameroon, and Chad, and then Niger. Forget 
about that over-spill. The over-spill is because at least they share that common 
border and seek refuge as and when the need arises. Those who seek resources, if 
they can take hostages and bargain for resources, they will do that. That’s how I 
look at it.  
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In the nutshell, his concerns are that the ongoing efforts of Ghana’s security agencies, 
coupled with Ghanaians’ ability to report criminals, their opposition to extremists views, 
and strong media reportage would “would not allow some of these extreme developments” 
to gain roots in the country. Also, he said, 
“It is very unlikely that you will have BH springing out in Ghana. We know that extreme 
groups might like to take advantage of what is happening in Nigeria to advance in Ghana, 
but it is just going to be isolated and be dealt with immediately it begins”, he retorted. 
Nevertheless, the security analyst further indicated that  
“You know in Ghana, if you are talking about political disagreements, as a potential for 
violence, you can have it. We have very sharp acrimonious politics that can create violent 
problems for it in future. But not terrorism. People can clash politically, but not to the 
extent of [engaging in] terrorist activities. Because the collateral damage will be too much. 
If you try to hit somebody, you will hit and hit so many of your own folks because of the 
extent of intermingling, intertwined nature of our society”. 
Additionally, the Head of Migration Management Board, Ms. Adjoa Shika, also posited 
that “…over here in Ghana, there is always the fear of BH invading Ghana. In her view, 
that fear stems from two perspectives; First, the tendency of the group to evade security 
and sneak into Ghana, a situation which could be facilitated by the West African ‘visa free 
regime’, ; second, the fact that BH, Hezbollah, and others’  quest to establishing a caliphate 
in West Africa was threatening to all states, including Ghana. 
Moreover, from the perspectives of Commodore Kojo Osei-Sarfo of the Ghana Armed 
Forces Command and Staff College, “relations and ethnic groups in West Africa cut across 
so that whatever happens in one country, one way or the other in the long run, may end up 
affecting others in other countries” He buttressed his position by arguing that since 
“Somebody is doing it in Nigeria and is gaining popularity, and success”, there will be 
somebody in Ghana who may think that since it can work in Nigeria, it can also work in 
Ghana, since ‘we are all  Muslims’.  The deputy Commandant cited the “ECOWAS free 
visa regime”, punctuated with “porous’ borders”, as factors facilitating the spread of events 
among the West African nations. 
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Moreover, according to Mr. Conrad Kakraba of the Ghana Broadcasting Corporation, the 
threats of BH is wide and “multifaceted”. He argued that once BH wants to establish an 
Islamic caliphate [in West Africa], you should be looking forward to threats not limited to 
Ghana owing to BH’s threats of radicalizing “everybody”. 
Dr. Colonel Kotia of the Kofi Annan International Peace Keeping and Training Centre 
(KAIPTC), cautioned the inimical effects of the BH issue on security, development, and 
economics. He indicated the links between the three phenomena; “Without security you 
cannot have development, and without development you cannot provide the social 
amenities of your people.  Consequently, monies which could have been channeled into 
developmental activities were diverted towards security”, he retorted. The Chief Instructor 
hinted that the whole of (West) Africa was not secured owing to the (possible) spread of 
BH elements and their attacks in the region. And that a surge in the situation would carry 
with it, economic consequences. “Now, if we have BH spreading more, it is going to have 
effects on businesses, [and] investments; investors outside Africa would not like to come 
and invest because of the dangers of it”. He discounted the view that Ghana is immune to 
the BH threat; “…Ghana can be affected because one; BH can spread to Ghana. This also 
brings to bare, the ECOWAS protocol (1979) which gives free movement of people across 
our borders. So that one can have effect on Ghana. Nobody knows”.  He therefore 
concluded by cautioning that “we should be ready for everything in this world because 
terrorism is an emerging security issue so no country can say that it is safe from any terrorist 
action [since] it can be imported and it can be brought from somewhere …”. 
For his part, Dr. Ahorsu of the Legon Centre for International Affairs and Diplomacy 
(LECIAD), claimed that, “As a regional hegemon to be seriously endangered by crisis that 
it cannot manage, possibly threatens the stability of Africa, [and] West Africa since it 
restricts Nigeria from assisting other African countries”. Also, he argued that no country 
in the region was safe owing to the transnational security threat. Furthermore, he indicated 
that Ghana’s involvement in Peacekeeping missions in terrorist-ridden countries, risked 
retaliatory attacks. He, however, opined that such threats may manifest themselves in 
different ways and may not necessarily involve ‘BH fighters who might disguise 
themselves or march with their weapons to Ghana and start killing. Rather, he opined that 
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the risk could take the form of a spread in ideology, and the sharing of same; “… whatever 
is happening in the Middle East, Nigeria, and other places is gradually spreading to all over 
the world. So there are people in Ghana who share the same ideology”. He corroborated 
his assertion by citing example;  “…And not long ago …a whole [Ghanaian] MP [was] 
arguing that he would not hesitate to support a bill in parliament which requires the stoning 
or elimination of women who commit adultery”. Dr. Ahorsu therefore stipulated that since 
Terrorism…is a struggle of ideas and manifests in violence, Ghana should be worried. He 
further asserted that the shared political, economic, and social architectural features of 
Ghana and Nigeria facilitate and complicate things, especially in the event of major crises; 
“At the same time, you would realize that our lives today are so intertwined economically, 
socially [and] politically. If there is a crisis in Nigeria, Ghana can be overwhelmed…. 
Ghana’s population now is probably between twenty five and twenty eight million. 
Nigeria’s population is close to three hundred million. There is a major crisis if one-eighth 
of that population come to Ghana, our structures and resources would be spread to the limit 
…So once Nigeria is in crisis, it affects Ghana”. Dr. Ahorsu indicated that blood relations 
…language, culture draw us [Ghanaians and Nigerians] closer…, but then all this form of 
terrorism again puts us very much apart. 
Moving further, Dr. Nicholas Okai of KAIPTC hinted that Ghana is not immune to the 
growth of sects similar to BH, and others. He argued that there could be  
“… Ghana’s version of BH. But what will drive it may not be religion. It can be 
unemployment …corruption, perception of corruption … ethnicity and its impacts. 
BH is something that has been packaged very early because of the religious element 
but it is something that is gradually waiting for every country in West Africa if we 
do not address this issue of unemployment, corruption and exclusionism. Yes. 
Nigeria’s version is ‘BH’. It is more of religion. But every country in West Africa 
can have its package of BH. And it is the youth pursuing an agenda in the name of 
something. Yes. Theirs is in the name of religion”. 
Moreover, Dr. Philip Attuquayefio of LECIAD, posited that “Once Nigeria is not secured, 
you can’t say that any country in the sub-region is secured. Nigeria is the largest. Should 
anything happen in Nigeria, and there is overflow of refugees, can we host them?” 
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For his part, Dr. Thomas Ajaye of KAIPTC shared similar sentiments that the insurgency 
caused by BH has affected people’s “sense of security”, to the effect that “we are all 
surviving in West Africa, but we are not secured”.  Dr. Ajaye did not rule out a potential 
spread of similar radical ideologies among the citizens of the region, with its attendant 
security implications of attacks, following ECOWAS’ Policy which permits the free 
movement of people and goods within the sub-region; “…If we were that secure then many 
of us will not even be talking about the potential effects of BH in the region. Where young 
people could use the same method anywhere by borrowing what they [BH] are doing. And 
because there is a policy of ‘free movement’ within the sub region, anybody can move from 
one area to the other and carry their arms with them leaving one country and moving to the 
next… that potential is there”.  
Following from this, Dr. Vladimir Antwi-Danso of LECIAD argued that “If Nigeria 
implodes, the whole of West Africa has imploded, [and] …the implosion of Nigeria, is 
detrimental to Ghana politically, and especially economically”, he retorted. Economic-
wise, it has detrimental effect on foreign direct investments. The danger is glaring since 
there is ‘gun running’ going on in West Africa already. Serious gun running. People are 
selling arms along the coast in the hinterland, and everywhere. People manufacturing illicit 
guns are also there. So this trade will boom. And it has serious implications for West Africa 
and Ghana”. This security threat, he said, has culminated in increased security spending on 
the part of countries. Consequently, the situation has seen some movement of Nigerians to 
other parts of Africa, including Ghana.  
A lot of Nigerians are already moving to other countries quietly. We haven’t seen 
the exodus yet. But in our own Ghana, there are a lot of Nigerians buying properties 
here. Undertaking all kinds of economic activities. In fact, last year, and two years 
ago, there were clashes on the streets because they (Nigerians) were engaging in 
businesses reserved for Ghanaians. So GUTA (Ghana United Traders Association) 
got up very strongly and physically wanted to move some of such persons from the 
streets. 
Additionally, he indicated that “Abdul Mutallab who nearly blew an American plane, 
bought his ticket in Accra, came to Accra, lived quietly, bought his ticket and was going to 
42 
 
do his ‘thing’”. As if that is not enough, he indicated that previously, a sizeable number of 
the members of the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND), ran to 
Ghana when they were pummeled by Nigeria”. Also, he said some Sudanese rebels/ 
refugees entered Ghana without the knowledge of the border authorities concerned. These 
enumerated examples buttressed his argument that “BH could come and stay here [Ghana] 
and then enjoy the freedoms that we have here and prepare from this ground”; A situation 
which is enhanced by the porosity of the Ghanaian borders, corruption, and lack of 
surveillance, security consciousness and inadequate awareness, among the Ghanaian 
populace”. 
For his part, DSP Edward Afful disclosed that Ghana is not far from BH because of the 
proximity, and the long-standing relationship between Ghana, and Nigeria. “…our 
closeness. Even though Nigeria is about two countries from here to the east, you could see 
that because Nigerians are our closest English speaking country there has been some influx 
of Nigerians currently into Ghana. Some of them have even come to inter-marry with 
Ghanaians. You can go to certain parts of the country [Ghana] to see a whole Nigerian 
community. So that alone tells you that we are not far from BH” 
He also hinted that unconfirmed reports suggested that previously, there had been some 
suspicious elements from Nigeria who had come to Ghana to undertake some “fundraising 
activities” to fund their cause in Nigeria. Whilst others were quelled and contained by some 
of Ghana’s security agencies, the situation was different in certain cases. DSP Afful 
compared the spread of the phenomenon of terrorism to that of the drug business; “…I can 
compare it with how drugs sometimes come as transit, [and] before you realize your 
country becomes consumed. So it’s the same thing terrorism can do. It [can] come as 
fundraising but before you realize, they have also entered your country”. He added that the 
activities of Fulani herdsmen and their connection with terrorists’ activities within the sub 
region partly underscore Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. He said, 
“…during the Mali [insurgency] issue, which partly featured the activities of Ansa dine, 
and MOJUA,the information was that there were some elements of BH who even went to 
join, and these people were able to pass through as ‘Fulani herdsmen’. They disguised 
themselves as Fulani herdsmen, and were able to pass through to join that fight. And Ghana 
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too has problem with Fulani herdsmen with that issue. So it tells you we are also fragile in 
those areas”. 
Against this background, the Intelligence Officer revealed that the development 
threathened Ghana’s security in the form of extremism, and religious radicalism. 
In terms of religion, he also said there were some detected effects of the wave of the BH 
crisis in some parts of Ghana. This situation featured “radical preaching by some Al-Sunna 
Imams’ and this situation is “… also having a little bit of effects on the Ghanaian Muslim”, 
owing to the fact that the “current terrorist organizations are all Al Sunni and these are the 
people who have started preaching radicalism” in Ghana. Additionally, their preaching 
against the Ahmadis, coupled with their quest for a Sunni successor to the outgoing Chief 
Imam, reflect the religious ramifications of the crisis; he said.  Furthermore, according to 
him, intelligence suggested that a Ghanaian was once an apprentice of the BH sect in 
Nigeria. “So you could clearly see that a Ghanaian has ever been trained with BH”. To add 
to that, he asserted that Osama bin laden enjoyed some support within some Muslim 
populated communities in Ghana post -9/11. This support was demonstrated by wearing 
Bin Laden’s paraphernalia, and the purchasing of his videos. Additionally, DSP Afful 
hinted that there was an allegation to the effect that an AQIM bomb expert purchased a 
fertilizer from Ghana some time ago,; and the transiting of a Nigerian terrorist, Omar 
Farouk Abdul Mutallab through Ghana with undetected improvised device in his coat, all 
corroborate the fact that ‘it [terrorism] is not far from us [Ghana].  
Afful further argued, socio-politico-economically Ghana tends to suffer “because we are 
the only English speaking country with Nigeria now. If it happens … [Ghana will bear the 
brunt of the] refugee problem.... They [Nigerian refugees] won’t go to Togo, they won’t 
go to Benin, they will come to Ghana….  Right now, to be very frank, everywhere and 
every time we travel outside and we go for courses, you see Ghana and Nigeria cooperate 
more than other countries …Even whenever we go for this security courses ‘outside’ 
[Ghana], the moment you see one Nigerian, one Ghanaian, before you realize the two of 
them are moving together. So that ‘thing’ [cordiality] is there … they inter-marriage too. 
now we have Nigerian wives association in Ghana (Ghana armed forces 2012-ghanaian 
and navy wives assoc collaborate). So it tells you that socially it is happening. Chief 
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Superintendent Nii Amartey for his part said indeed, Ghana offers a serene atmosphere for 
Nigerians  
Again, Group Captain Kojo Yankah pointed out that poor security infrastructure, moderate 
rescue measures, insecure public places, among others, reflected the seeming lack of 
appreciation for the contemporary development on the phenomenon of terrorism. gave 
much cause for concern should there be some attacks by the sect within the borders of 
Ghana. 
Following from that Mr. Agbenyegah of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asserted that “the 
situation was more threatening for Ghana given Ghana’s similar attributes, and relationship 
with Nigeria;  
For the fact that being former colonies of Britain aside, we share so many things in 
common. Culture, inter-marriages, trade and investment. Indeed, Nigeria is a very 
big economy that if Ghana will be able to export or invest in that country, we don’t 
need to go outside Africa. So whatever happens there, and you know as a Ghanaian 
that the surest way for a Nigerian fleeing from BH is to come to Ghana because we 
have similarities in a lot of things. They can’t speak French. They will look alien. 
But if they come to Ghana, they speak English. We have people of Yoruba and Igbo 
descent here, and even they themselves are here. So assuming over the one hundred 
and seventy million Nigerians we have, assuming just ten percent of them cross to 
Ghana, are they not more than Accra population? and obviously they will come to 
Accra first. That alone, we need to protect against. And the fact that not all of them 
who are coming here will have clear mind or clear intentions. The security 
…repercussions are great for us… 
Additionally, Mr. Bonaventura Adjavor of the Economic Community of West African 
States (ECOWAS) section of the African Bureau division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
and Regional Integration emphasized the fact that Ghana faced a potential threat of attacks 
from BH, Al-Shabaab, and others since “no country is free from the terrorist threat (s), or 
isolated from terrorist attack (s). His position stressed the fact “you may not know when 
they will strike on you. You can only be alert. For that matter, I can say whether BH or Al-
Shabaab…, it can happen to any country, any time”. 
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Similarly, Mrs. Afua Yakohene of LECIAD argued that in the face of mounting terrorist 
attacks by BH, and AL-Shabaab against African countries, coupled with ISIL’s attacks in 
Iraq, and Syria, Ghana’s vulnerability to the menace of terrorism remained high, and that 
cannot be discounted. From this standpoint, he reiterated that “no country is immune to 
terrorism and its related incidence” 
Furthermore, according to Mr. Samuel Amankwah of Ghana’s Ministry of the Interior, 
Ghana is not immune to the implications, impacts, and threats of the Nigerian crisis. He 
buttressed this assertion citing the monolithic nature of the African continent and the fact 
that terrorism is transportable and transferrable. He said Ghana should be mindful of the 
fact that they [BH] can come here Ghana]. 
For his part, Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi Aning indicated that should the problem linger, Ghana 
could bear more risks; He said the myriad of problems accounting for the crisis in Nigeria, 
are equally evident in Ghana, and therefore this country [Ghana] is ripe for all these things 
[terrorism, and its accompanying incidences]. Every single reason given by terrorist groups 
are ripe in Ghana, he said. 
Last but not least, Mr. John Pokoo indicated that the ensuing crisis, and its accompanying 
threats has repercussions for Ghana especially if [BH] should succeed in expanding their 
territory.  He added, “… we are already facing it [the impacts] Politically since Nigeria has 
been the bank roller of our regional integration efforts and to spend that much on BH affects 
other important areas as well. A safe West Africa also means a safe Nigeria. So our interest 
is intrinsically linked to Nigeria. Ghana’s relation with Nigeria is cordial and fruitful. I 
think it's growing as well. We've attempted to base our entire Gas supply in Nigeria. And 
once again that is the effect. Today there is strike, tomorrow they've blown up the pipe and 
all that and so we are in a 'dumsor' [intermittent light offs] as the same situation is all part 
of what is happening in Nigeria. We really start to lose if things don’t improve. 
 
HOW DO THE CURRENT SOCIO-POLITICO-ECONOMIC AND RELIGIOUS   
CONDITIONS (SPEAR) IN GHANA INFLUENCE THE PROSPECTS OF 
DOMESTIC TERRORISM IN GHANA? 
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Additionally, interviewees gave some perspectives on how Ghana’s current SPEAR 
conditions affect the potential rise of terrorist groups. They are as follows; 
First, Mr. Alex Adu indicated that the current economic hardships in Ghana could inform 
people’s decision to engage in terrorism, though he admitted that things were gradually 
improving, and therefore expressed optimism. 
Ms. Debrie on her part cited dissatisfaction within the Ghanaian populace owing to the 
inequality gap between the rich and the poor, as an important area where the government 
of Ghana could consider to prevent or reduce (potential) incidence of terrorism in the 
country. Nonetheless, she argued that Government was making gradual progress, and 
expressed the fact that it was impossible to satisfy the needs of all Ghanaians, hence the 
inequality gap.  
Moreover, the Security Analyst argued that problems of corruption and extreme political 
activity remain hot beds for political violence in Ghana; …We have that kind of 
acrimonious rhetoric in our political system. If you ask me what the biggest threat to Ghana 
is, I will not talk about BH. I will talk about politicians. Because of their quest for power, 
they go to certain extreme. Like the use of ‘Macho’ [strongly built] men, snatching ballot 
boxes here and there… 
For her part, Ms. Adjoa Shika hinted that Ghana Government’s policy interventions must 
be devoid of exclusionism, and be much more representative; otherwise the tendencies for 
some Ghanaians to subscribe to terrorism would remain unabated.  
Similarly, Kojo Osei-Sarfo reiterated the need to rid the Ghanaian society of all kinds of 
discrimination. He said there should be equal opportunities, and respect for one another 
irrespective of tribe, ethnicity, or tongue. As if that was not enough, he advocated for an 
ethno-tribal-religious-free politics; National politics should not be village-based, ethnic-
based, tribal or religious-based, he argued. Additionally, same recommends a more 
professional, reliable and credible media (reportage); “The media should not be a platform 
for casting insinuations, and [preaching] …despair among people” as it generates division 
and hatred among the citizenry. Last but not least, he advised that equity should accompany 
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all facets and fabric of the Ghanaian society in order to bring a lot of satisfaction among 
the populace. 
For his turn, Kakraba posited that perennial leadership problem and corruption were 
important sources for domestic terrorism in Ghana; 
Leadership is key. …Ghana has over the years had leaders who have been so disappointing 
when it comes to delivering the goods that the people have put them into positions of trust 
to be able to deliver”. Also, he aired that 
[Corruption] has taken epic proportions. No government is immune to the problem 
of corruption in Ghana and many of them have been so blatant and flagrant in their 
abuse of the national purse and people have been so disenchanted, so disgruntled 
and we have had a lot of agitations coming from young people … who feel so 
peeved by the way that the purse is being plundered. And you see that …the 
Committee for Joint Action (CJA), Alliance for Accountable Governance (AFAG), 
and all of these pressure groups arise as a result of these malfeasance, the economic 
deprivations that the people are subjected to. And for me the government of the day 
ought to address this …and …for us, all our problems actually rise and fall, on 
leadership. And so Ghana’s leadership systems must be seen as active for the people 
to be able to have all the necessary things that will help them just to maintain the 
peace, [and] keep the peace. 
Similarly, Okai expostulated that leadership crisis and corruption are critical areas that 
should not escape attention [in Ghana] given the current trends; Hence, advocating for 
quality leadership, and corruption-free Ghanaian society. 
For Kotia, ‘good governance’, ‘liberal democratic tenets’, policy of all-inclusiveness and 
participation, and ‘prudent economic policies’ are key to preventing and or reducing 
‘discontentment in society’, and for that matter, terrorism in Ghana. 
From the standpoint of Ahorsu, it was urgent for Ghana to salvage the current situations of 
relative inequality, poor infrastructure, inter-religious conflicts, and the exclusion of the 
youth in the engagements of all SPEAR discussions. Hence the need for Ghana to do the 
following; First, there should be uniform development in the country; second, 
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infrastructures must be enhanced, especially in the impoverished areas; third, the existing 
inter-religious dialogue must be improved; fourth, the youth representing the various 
religious communities in Ghana must be engaged in all forms of education, policy 
formulation, participation, and inclusion. He maintained that the youth must be 
enlightened on SPEAR issues that pertain to all facets of their endeavors; “Economic issues 
must be explained to them. Why certain things look the way they are, the limitations of the 
government, [and] their views must be heard”, he said. “These would largely preempt any 
form of radicalism. Because when people feel that they are listened to, their views are taken 
onboard, they become part and parcel of the society…But when they are like the forgotten 
masses, then radicalism, because nobody cares about them, nobody knows about their 
views”. He observed also that the National Peace Council, among other conflict-resolution 
institutions are living up to expectation, but needed to be more representative by 
incorporating the youth. He contends that the youth whose views should equally be taken 
are not represented in the peace council’, and urged a swift correction to be done. 
Moreover, Attuquayefio argued that to the extent that you have radicalized Muslims … [in 
Ghana], there should be a cause for concerns especially if “avenues that give opportunity 
to further radicalize them exist…” 
For Jaye, Ghana needed to tackle the socio-economic issues of poverty, and unemployment, 
whilst improving other areas for good living conditions of the citizenry. 
For his turn, Antwi-Danso asserted that the nature of Ghanaian politics, and politicians 
facilitate terrorism; 
If there is going to be any terrorist organization in Ghana, it will come from politics. 
The way we run our politics. The way we are very profligate, in our spending and 
in our ways, [and] lifestyle because we are in politics. It generates animosity 
towards politics. [Additionally], the way we elect our leadership. No matter how 
fraudulent the thing is, we must accept a leader. ..And I believe if there is going to 
be terrorist organization; it is going to come from there. When people are so peeved 
that the only way they think they can frustrate government is to form terrorist 
organizations. It will come from politics. 
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He however contended that “it might take a long time for Ghana to go on those lines when 
poverty is concerned because our social set up is such that everybody cares for everybody”. 
Last but not least, he downplayed the existence of small and light weapons in the country 
as a potential catalyst for terrorist activities; “…Gun running in Ghana is minimal…People 
are manufacturing arms, People are bringing in illicit arms and selling them and others, but 
they are minimal. So those arms are used for criminal activities like armed robbery, 
banditry and that kind of thing…” 
From his perspective, Afful highlighted the fact that Ghana was struggling to rid itself of 
corruptible practices. “If we don’t have the political will to combat corruption, we will find 
ourselves as in Nigeria”, he cautioned. Additionally, he said unemployment was rife and 
could have ill effects on the country. He therefore encouraged the practice of identifying 
more opportunities to engage the youth. Also, he underscored the need for leaders to be 
visionary and innovative, and have the “will to implement good policies”.  
Moreover, Aning said that the myriad of problems accounting for the emergence of BH in 
Nigeria are equally evident in Ghana, hence, this country [Ghana] is ripe for all these 
things [terrorism, and its related incidence]. “Every single reason given by terrorist groups 
are ripe in Ghana…” owing to the lack of “transparency, accountability, and poor 
governance, inequalities, and poor leadership…” 
According to Pokoo, Ghana is still struggling with some challenges that needed to be 
surmounted; ...As a country, our economic standpoint is not the best. Even the domestic 
worthy issues that promote our wellbeing and prosperity [such as] education, health, 
among others, are lacking…We just hope that nothing bad happens. 
In the face of the (perceived) threats to Ghana, some perspectives were professed by the 
respondents. Asked what they thought of the counter terrorism measures Ghana had 
(instituted) to curtail, the following concerns were raised; 
According to Afful and CSP Amartey, the Ghana Police Service (GPS), in collaboration 
with the rest of the security agencies are working to the best of their ability. Some of the 
measures they have taken include the establishment of new counter terrorism units within 
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the Ghana Police Service (GPS), a joint operational command (JOC), and an Emergency 
Operating Center (EOC); anti-radicalization programs, and regular education, and training. 
However, they indicated the following as challenges confronting their work, which include 
lack of inter-agency cooperation and communication, equipment and logistics; reluctance 
of information delivery by some citizens for arrest; and the difficulty in detecting legitimate 
monies from illegitimate ones; Amartey stressed that financial terrorism seems to 
becoming a thing which …is increasing every day. Because of our oil find, large amount 
of monies are flowing into the country and therefore it is very difficult to track which money 
is meant for terrorist activities and those meant for normal business. 
Additionally, the Custom Official revealed that Ghana has always been ready for such a thing, the 
National security are on top of that; Regularly, the security agencies have been meeting, and have 
been having series of training on joint counter-insurgency courses. The security agencies are 
always ready to confront any such aggression in the country. Ghana is much prepared and well 
equipped. 
Furthermore, Amankwah indicated that “since we [Ghanaians] haven’t had any overblown 
incidence [in light of the counter terrorism measures] we would assume that we are being 
successful”. 
Also, Debrie said …Ghana is already doing what it can; Ghana is trying.  
Similarly, Mr. Bonaventura Adjavor said Ghana is doing its possible best to continue to be well 
prepared, to combat any such situation …[since] its  security forces are up to the task, and are 
very much alert. [Nevertheless], we could only hope and pray that we don’t face such situation. 
Furthermore, Ahorsu indicated that 
Ghana is prepared but whether they are adequately or absolutely prepared against any form 
of threat …is something no one can say. …And to a large extent, while Ghana is not 
immune to terrorist attacks as we’ve seen that the ‘December bomber’ passed through 
Kotoka International Airport17,  we have not suffered this issue, apart from the Eastern 
region, where they say there is a Muslim community which is manifesting signs of these 
                                                          
17 Ghana’s foremost airport 
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monotheistic BH manifestations. Much as we say that as a people who are largely tolerant 
of each other, we must equally give credit to the security agencies that so far they have 
worked to secure the country. 
Similarly, Agbenyegah argued that “preparations against terrorism is a process and event. 
You take it every day. If they are not able to get you that day, it means you are prepared. 
So yes! By all standards and everything we [Ghana] think we are prepared. But …no one 
is water tight prepared against terrorism or any crime for that matter”. 
Nevertheless, Antwi-Danso contended that “there were adequate [counter terrorism 
measures in Ghana] in terms of institutional arrangements, but inadequate in terms of 
awareness, and security consciousness on the part of the citizenry.  
Kakraba, and Ajaye, posited that Ghana’s preparation is one of moderation. The former 
said, Ghana has not really prepared adequately on the score [because] Ghana’s 
preparation is moderate, in terms of intelligence, personnel, and equipment. Similarly, the 
latter said Ghana’s preparation fell “…somewhere in the middle there, but to say 
‘adequately’, I will have my doubts.  But looking at how West Africa is, and the way things 
are happening, a lot of countries are still not prepared…Ghana is up to the task but [the 
preparations] can never be adequate. 
However, Awini, Adwoa Shika, Yakohene, Okine, and Aning maintained that Ghana was 
lagging behind in the area of anti-terrorism preparations. 
For her part, Adwoa Shika indicated that she does not see a very strong counter terrorism 
measure in Ghana; a situation she thinks is partly due to the covet nature of the intelligence 
work. In addition, Okine argued that “…we [Ghana] are not [prepared]. Terrorism has its 
phases from the structural to the proximate to the impact. First when it comes to the root 
causes, we are not addressing the root causes. When it comes to issues of proximate factors 
that can come to Ghana, we have not addressed it. When it comes to the personnel who 
can really take care of the impact, reduce the impact, reduce the possible detonation of a 
bomb and all that, we don’t have it. So we are just waiting, we are just waiting”, he 
emphasized. 
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Last but not least, Aning argued that evidence of effective counter terrorism measures were 
missing in Ghana. He said, for example, if there is a bomb at Accra Mall18 or something 
that goes out from a car, and somebody is hurt, how do you evacuate such a place? Because 
to him, no proper planning or measures have gone into the putting up of buildings, and 
infrastructure, even after the -9/11 attacks, [and] in countries that are sensitive to terrorism 
issues, such a sensitive center [the Accra Mall] will be better guarded, [and] better 
patrolled…Additionally, he said, there is really no security consciousness about the need 
to enlighten people, to make them sharp [in Ghana]. He also bemoaned the “lack of 
forensic experts, specialized anti-terrorism Judges and Prosecutors…” inter alia, as a 
demonstration of how “unprepared” the country is.  
5.1 Analysis and Discussion 
The findings underscored the fact that BH’s radical ideological influence remain a key 
source of terrorism threat to Ghana. Generally, the respondents indicated that Ghanaians 
remain susceptible to BH’s violent radical ideology. Prominent among these respondents 
include the Security expert, Messrs Ajayi, Ahorsu, Afful, and others. When these assertions 
are juxtaposed with BH’s quest for a regional reach19 there could be little doubt that 
Ghanaians are at the mercy of   threats posed by the sect. The findings also noted that events 
in Ghana are seldom influenced (partly) by events in Nigeria. As a consequence, some 
respondents asserted that one cannot rule out the possibilities where a section of Ghanaians 
are influenced by the activities of BH arising from the harshness of shared SPEAR 
concerns in Ghana and Nigeria since violent radicalization, and for that matter, terrorism 
does not take place in a vacuum, but partly through the exploitation of adverse conditions 
by terrorists. These assertions find some expression in the fact that incidences of BH-
related activities have taken place in Ghana. This therefore reflects the contagion and 
diffusion theory of transnational terrorism which explains the fact that violent radical 
ideologies, or terrorist actions spread across different locations irrespective of the 
geographical boundaries and barriers. As posited by the respondents, the adverse similar 
                                                          
18 One of the biggest Malls in Ghana 
19 As evidenced by its change of name to Islamist State West African Province, after its merger with ISIS; 
punctuated with its bid to annex territories, and expand its network base via recruitments, and consciously 
calculated spread of its ideology through its propaganda machinery 
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SPEAR conditions between the two countries boost their influence on each other, hence 
Ghanaians’ susceptibility to embrace BH’s radical ideologies, and implement same in their 
country.  This supports the explanation offered by the structural strain theory of terrorism 
to the effect that similar structural problems of poverty, unemployment, religious 
radicalization iwhich are embedded in the Ghanaian state account for the citizens’ sense of 
alienation (relative deprivation), and therefore boost their morale to support, and 
sympathize with the cause of BH, and its activities since BH’s ideology is premised on 
opposing western civilization, which in BH’s views have produced poverty, and 
unemployment, and have adulterated the cherished culture of Islam, and Nigeria. In this 
light, those who feel that BH represent their interest and share their concerns, and therefore 
are influenced one way or the other to support’ the cause or the ideology of BH virtually 
make them (unofficial) members of BH’s social movement.  
However, not all the respondents indicated that BH’s attacks in Nigeria posed a threat to 
Ghana. This position was taken by the security analyst. Even though he did not discount 
the adverse security implications of BH’s activities on Ghana, he nonetheless argued that 
the sect’s terrorist attacks were restricted to Nigeria, and limited to the immediate 
neighbors of same. These assertions agree with the findings of  (Oftedal 2013b) on the 
domestic aspect of BH. To some extent, these observations give lie to the argument that 
BH has a regional agenda. As a consequence, it weakens the argument that the sect poses 
a transnational threat to Ghana. This standpoint is boosted by evidence of the former’s 
relatively concentrated attacks directed against Nigeria. Similarly, its incursions against 
Chad, Niger, Cameroon, and Benin result from the joint military attacks the sect suffers 
from the Nigerian-led coalition. And indeed, there are incidences where some civilian and 
military persons of Nigeria’s immediate neighbors have borne the brunt of the sect through 
deaths, and injuries, which is not same with Ghana. Against this backdrop, it could be 
argued that the threat posed by BH is probably confined to Nigeria, and to some extent its 
immediate neighbors. Nevertheless, whilst these developments lend credence to BH as a 
domestic phenomenon, same cannot be said in terms of the sect’s ideological influence 
beyond Nigeria’s national boundaries. This stems from the prospects of the sect’s 
ideological influence, and impacts in an era where the world is experiencing an 
unprecedented surge in electronic and print media, social networking platforms, and 
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globalization. In other words, the proliferated number of networking media, punctuated 
with globalization render geographical boundaries almost non-existent as they ‘glue’ the 
world into a global village. From this perspective, BH’s transnational threat to Ghana 
arguably remains visible, even if the sect is still regarded as a domestic phenomenon in this 
context. This is because members of the Islamist group may not necessarily need to get 
into the corridors of Ghana before influencing unsuspecting victims, or perpetrating 
terrorist attacks against their host country. The attacks could be executed by their 
sympathizers or members of their social movement in Ghana, hence the social movement 
theory of transnational terrorism.  
To a large extent, terrorism as a transportable, transferable, importable, and exportable 
phenomenon has been strengthened by evidence of attacks around the globe where 
propaganda by terrorists have influenced, and informed some sympathizers20  to carryout 
strings of attacks across same. For example, ISIS’ attacks, and propaganda influenced some 
‘sympathizers’ of same to carry out terrorists activities in Australia, Nigeria, and the UK. 
This underscores some respondents’ assertions that events, and activities instigated by BH 
in Nigeria, and beyond could be ‘practiced’ by Ghanaians within and without Ghana who 
may be convinced of BH’s approach as probably an ‘effective’ means of addressing their 
concerns in Ghana.  Among other factors, it could be argued that the desire to ‘import’ and 
implement ideologies of BH by sympathizers of the sect in Ghana could be given further 
boost by the perceived/real concerns and challenges of Ghana’s unreliable institutions, and 
other state apparatus which highlights the lost legitimacy of the state. And once the state/its 
institutions lose their legitimacy in the eyes of their subjects, it paves way for terrorism to 
thrive. For instance, the transnational threat of BH was evidenced in the recent recruitment 
of some Ghanaian graduates into the ranks of ISIL. Prominently, the recruitment exercise 
featured a BH-ISIS collaboration (Global Risk Insights 2015). The report notes that “the 
Islamic State’s recruits from Ghana are believed to have journeyed to Nigeria to receive 
training at a BH training camp in Niger before traveling to Turkey or Syria”. Already, two 
students who had earlier joined the group were heading to Syria from Lebanon, according 
to a Deputy Minister of Education, Samuel Okudzeto Ablakwa (ghanaweb 2015f).  
                                                          
20 In this case ‘unoffical’social movement members 
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Furthermore, the findings reveal that Islamic religious radicalization add to the list of 
Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism. The assertions 
by Aning, Ahorsu, Afful, Jayi, Attuquayefio, Amoakohene among others, corroborate 
research findings by (Botha 2008; Collier 2006; Ismail 2013)Botha (2008). Afful observed 
that there is rampant religious extremism owing to the propagation of extreme doctrinal 
sermons by particularly the Sunni sects in Ghana. Whilst Afful contended that the 
preaching of these extreme sermons accompanied radicalization, and violence in the 
country, such violence took place among different Islamic sects owing to doctrinal 
differences. What is more, he indicated that radicalization was not directed against the state 
but against the different strands of Islam in the country. Nevertheless, he was quick to add 
that there is a growing incidence of religious radicalization and violence among Muslims. 
He contended that these developments had inimical repercussions for the security of the 
state. This observation ties in neatly with Aning and Abdallah (2013)  findings on religious 
radicalization and violence in Ghana. The authors assert that R.R in Ghana is relatively 
minimal; and targeted not at the State but against factions of the same sect on the one hand, 
and against other different religious groups on the other. Accordingly, they undermine 
State security (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 104). The pockets of violence, which accompany 
such radicalism pose inimical threats to state’s security, and stability given the nature they 
take. For instance, some churches in Ghana were attacked in 1998, and 1999 following an 
annual traditional ban on drumming (All Africa 1998; Tsikata & Seini 2004) owing to 
opposition from Christians who saw the ban as unconstitutional, and inimical to their rights 
of worship. 
Again, the extent of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism arising from violent 
religious radicalization is reflected in the external support of funds received from Saudi 
Arabia, and other Gulf States which tend to influence the propagation of extreme versions 
of Islam in (Northern) Ghana as argued by Afful, and affirmed by (Aning & Abdallah 2013 
p. 105). The Ahlussunna, and the Ahmadis are notably reported to be beneficiaries of such 
support (ibid.). Similarly, Barker (1986) notes that the growing Islamic activities and 
culture in Northern Ghana is a stark reminder of the congenial atmosphere that has come 
characterize that portion of the country; 
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Tamale in particular is becoming an important Muslim center. Saudi and 
the Gulf States are channeling oil wealth into promoting Islam in Africa, 
and in recent years a series of new Muslim institutions has appeared on the 
scene. In Tamale alone there are over a dozen Muslim missionaries at the 
present time. 
These (external) support which are geared towards influencing doctrine, beliefs and 
practices may have inimical implications for the State’s security and stability. This position 
is similarly informed by (Katanga 1994 p. 27) who asserts that the multiplication of Muslim 
missionaries in Ghana are increasingly projecting new strands of Islam which are by nature 
anti-Christian, and militaristically Islam-bias. Though Northern Ghana is more prone to 
Islamic radicalization and violence, than the southern part owing to the prevalence of 
Islamic extremism (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 108), the tendency of the phenomenon to 
spill or spread across the length and breadth of the country potentially remain factual rather 
than fiction.  More so, the issue of Nigeria’s influence on Ghana, in terms of religion, 
among others cannot be discounted. Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 108) posit that the 
Ahlussunna 21Imams in Ghana are influenced by events in Nigeria because they perceive 
Nigerians to be better devout Muslims than Ghanaian Muslims. What is more, these radical 
Ahlussunna Muslims in Ghana are characterized by their condemnations of blasphemous 
acts by individuals, and (secular) States who are perceived to be anti-Islam. For example, 
they devote their Friday sermons, and other social outings to inculcate in their (potential) 
members the need to castigate anti-Muslim leaders, states and institutions. Events such as 
the U.S invasion of Afghanistan, and Iraq, the NATO-led operations in Libya that toppled 
Colonel Quaddafi, among host of others, were met with scathing criticisms from some 
Muslims in Ghana (ibid.). However, Aning and Abdallah (2013) maintain that in all these 
events, no attempt has been identified by any of the Islamic groups to undermine the 
authority of the Ghanaian state. Neither do they exhibit any intention of annexing political 
power as is the case in Northern Mali, Nigeria, and Arab countries like Egypt; which 
therefore underscored the authors’ “lead proposition [that] radicalization and violence in 
Ghana is not targeted at the state” (Aning & Abdallah 2013 p. 118). 
                                                          
21 Used synonymously as Sunna by Aning and Abdallah (2013) 
57 
 
Nonetheless, without wholly discounting the salience of the findings by Aning and 
Abdallah (2013), it could be contended that their position probably has some blind spot 
which could be remedied by widening the angle of their conceptual lens on religion to 
cover the instrumental use of the phenomenon by entities. It is argued that religion as a 
phenomenon bridges people of similar faiths but from different backgrounds together. 
Additionally, people who share similar religion enjoy a relatively higher degree of trust 
and social capital among themselves. As a consequence, the ‘bond’ between members of 
similar faiths is relatively stronger than the reverse. However, owing to these merits 
enjoyed by members of similar faiths, sub national actors such as terrorists (may) explore 
religion from an instrumentalist perspective, and exploit the vulnerabilities of members of 
same. The ‘Instrumentalist Approach to religion’ asserts that people could consciously 
exploit the ignorance and vulnerability of members of similar faiths with the view to 
championing their interests via religion. That is religion offers a medium through which 
people advance their diverse interests. Sometimes, some terrorist groups cleverly craft their 
ideologies in religious terms with the view to achieving their political ends.  Against this 
backdrop, however, it could be argued that Ghana may not be immune to the situations in 
Mali, Nigeria, and Egypt where attempts by religious extremists at undermining state 
authority, and consequently annexing political power, are seemingly becoming regular 
features. This is anchored on the argument that (some) religious extremists in Ghana (the 
Ahl Sunna sect) share similar ideologies with similar religious extremists in Nigeria (Aning 
& Abdallah 2013). Indeed, the fact that some Imams in Ghana take a cue from their 
Nigerian counterparts (ibid.) is indicative of the level at which (some) Ghanaians are 
susceptible to their Nigerian fellows. And since some Ghanaian religious leaders are not 
entirely immune to the gullibility of extreme ideas (or violent radical religious approach) 
of their Nigerian counterparts, and beyond, the impact may have wider implications for 
Ghana. For example, radicalized Ghanaian Imams could influence their followers, families, 
and friends. In this light, the ideologies could spread across the country, the repercussions 
for which could be disastrous as evidenced in the Nigerian situation. Not to mention the 
fact that Ghana receive funding and other support from a pro-Islamic state such as Saudi 
Arabia, which make the former gullible to implement the latter’s extreme religious 
ideologies. It is striking to note that whilst extreme religious doctrine from Saudi Arabia 
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or other gulf states may not necessarily lead to violent radicalization of Ghanaians who 
embrace them, the tendency for unsuspecting religiously-inspired terrorist group like BH 
could exploit the situation in the face of structural problems 22besetting Ghana. There could 
be little doubt that the presence of some or mix of the structural problems could strain them 
to resort to other means 23 lost legitimacy of state/state-owned institutions becomes of their 
unreliability. Additionally, the structural problems could lead them to feel relatively 
deprived  as they compare themselves with the few 24who enjoy the ‘national cake’ at the 
expense of the majority. Consequently, they become alienated, and remain susceptible to 
the influence of good/bad social movements that seem to share their concerns. Owing to 
their grievances, and in the face of unreliable institutions, they could resort to create or join 
social movements, whose activities may or may not include terrorist actions. These 
tendencies make Ghanaians susceptible to the influence of BH, and other terrorist groups, 
which consequently threaten the security of their country.  
That notwithstanding, it could be argued that in as much as (some) Ghanaians remain 
susceptible to the influence of BH, and by extension events in Nigeria, same remain 
susceptible to the positive influences of some of Nigeria’s good people and events in 
Nigeria. For example, if (some) potentially radicalized groups in Ghana derive inspiration 
from Nigeria, the reverse could be true for some sections of Ghanaians who may emulate 
the inspiration provided them by ‘moderate’ groups in Nigeria. In this respect, there could 
be a mixture of positive and negative impacts on Ghana/Ghanaians. However, reliance on 
historical events should remain key in analyzing events in Nigeria and their (potential) 
implications, impacts or influence on Ghana. Going by this, Ghana has had to bear the 
brunt of some of Nigeria’s adverse impacts such as Prostitution, cybercrime, armed 
robbery, among others, on its soil as posited by some respondents. In relation to the recent 
reports of recruitment of some Ghanaians into the ranks of BH/ISIL (Global Risk Insights 
2015), reports indicate that religion featured prominently in the recruitment. It notes that 
all the recruits were Muslims. Judging from the ideologies, activities and propaganda of 
                                                          
22 Poverty, unemployment, poor governance, corruption, ethnic and chieftaincy conflicts were identified by 
respondents as rooted in Ghana 
23 Some may seek legal sources, but here the emphasis is on the structural strain theory) of illegality such as 
terrorism to address their grievances, owing to the (perceived) 
24  Vladimir Antwi danso indicated that most political elites in Ghana become relatively richer few days after taking 
office, and flaunt their wealth, which elicits discontentment 
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BH, and ISIL, it may be obvious to conceive these groups as Muslim-dominated or Islam-
based. In this light, the shared religions of the recruiters and the recruits may have partly 
facilitated the recruitment. However, this is not to say that it is impossible for non-Muslims 
to join the ranks of BH/ISIL. In addition to this is the fact that the recruits showed similar 
signs of support against western civilization. The report notes that one of the recruits named 
Nazir, had a conception of democracy which is consistent with BH. Nazir said among other 
things, “…I know it might sound kind of crazy for you but your son really had to take this 
bold step to get out of the corrupt system of Ghana which has democracy first on its list,” 
(ghanaweb 2015c; Global Risk Insights 2015).  
In furtherance to the above, the findings of the research highlighted the ‘close’ relationship 
between Ghana and Nigeria as a (potentially) important source of BH-induced terrorist 
threat to Ghana. This ‘closeness’ relates to the geographical proximity of both countries, 
their SPEAR attributes, as well as their “cordial relationship”. Nigeria’s immediate 
neighbors include Cameroon, Niger, Chad, and Benin. However, by road, Ghana separates 
Nigeria by 22 hours, 44 minutes, or 1, 587 km on the average (google 2015c).  But the 
shared socio-politico-economic, historical, and religious attributes, and their long-standing 
relations make the two West African nations appear closer. Their closeness is equally 
reflected on the international scene in the realm of politics. In terms of business, both 
countries have institutions in each other’s country, and same has engendered (some) 
nationals of both countries to merge, and partner one another in the corporate world, and 
in the world of showbiz. As if that is not enough, this ‘Ghana-Nigeria relationship’ has 
enhanced their inter marriages, immigration, and other social affairs.  In this light, the 
influx of nationals of both divide in the other’s country accompany positive, and negative 
effects on each other. Given the subject under discussion, Ghana’s vulnerability to the 
phenomenon of terrorism may not be far-flung, or far from reality owing to Nigeria’s 
influence on Ghana through this “closeness” and “cordial relationship”. This partly 
accounts for reasons why some events in Nigeria seldom find their place in the Ghana. 
Consequently, it could be contended that the current insecurity situation in Nigeria (could) 
covertly, overtly, directly or indirectly have harmful repercussions for Ghana; a thought 
which is informed by the importation, and its resultant diffusion cum contagion of 
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cybercrime, and prostitution from Nigeria to Ghana25. The monolithic nature of the sub 
region which facilitates the spread of events across member states adds weight to the extent 
to which Ghana is exposed to the threat of domestic and transnational terrorism induced or 
reflective of BH, or other terrorist groups.  This assertion is premised on the shared web of 
social vices, and criminalities that define the West African sub region, and the inter-
connectedness of countries along socio-politico-economic, religious, ethnic, and cultural 
lines. That notwithstanding, if the threats are anything to go by, they could be counteracted 
by the fact that Nigeria and Ghana collaborate, and cooperate in matters of security; share 
intelligence, engage in joint military training, and education, among others. Similarly, the 
threat could be hampered by the fact that there are good Nigerians living within and without 
Ghana, with socio-politico-economic, and religious ties to Ghana, and may therefore 
impact positively on Ghanaians due to their  ties and ‘interest’ in Ghana. In this view, their 
transnational relations could concurrently endanger, and secure their national security. 
Nonetheless, the adverse  repercussions that could arise from their closeness seems to 
outweigh the positives given the fact that the “terrorists” in Nigeria are inflicting wounds 
on their self, family, and fellow countrymen, one cannot discount how much of a casualty 
they could cause on their relatively distant Ghanaian relatives and friends.  
To add to the above is the threat posed by the influx of refugees in Ghana. This was a 
concern among most respondents, and are equally highlighted by (Sosuh 2011). The 
displacement of refugees could be ubiquitous, and could take place at any time, and 
anywhere. One of the socio-politico-economic challenges of Africa is seen in its area of 
displacements of nationals. This is so owing to causal factors of political instability, and 
insecurity, civil unrests, and wars, among others. A UNHCR (2004) global report indicates 
that Africa identifies with six of the world’s major producing refugee countries, and same 
has a number of millions of its citizens living in foreign countries as refugees. Given its 
relative peace, and stability on the continent, Ghana has not been spared of hosting 
refugees. The country has played hosts to displaced persons from similar West African 
countries of Cote d’Ivoire, Sudan, Togo and Mali (UNHCR 2007). As the report noted 
among other things, Ghana hosted the largest refugee, and asylum-seeking population in 
                                                          
25 That has led to an exacerbation of these social vices in Ghana 
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the sub region at the end of 2007, totaling 35,000. Apart from formally recognized refugees 
who seek asylum in Ghana, other groups and individuals who claim to be refugees had 
entered Ghana through the back door. Notable among them were some “Sudanese 
refugees” who entered the country in April 2005 (Sosuh 2011 p. 17). Their presence went 
unnoticed until they personally went to the police to “regularize” their status as residents 
(Ghana News Agency, cited in (Sosuh 2011 p. 17). Similarly, some residents of Nigeria’s 
Niger Delta region sneaked into Ghana undetected, until their identities were later 
established (ibid.). Their presence in Ghana was considered threat to national security 
given their historical connections to “violence”, and terrorism (World news 2010, cited in 
ibid.).  In her findings,  Sosuh (2011 p. 17) has identified a number of deleterious security 
ramifications of the influx of refugees in Ghana ; 
“…They put strain on the economy, environment and social infrastructure, and can be 
predisposed to crime especially those coming from civil war situation. They could bring 
their weapons and use them for criminal activities… their prolonged stay could alter the 
ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic composition of a country.  
Another source of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of transnational terrorism lie in the 
unstable and insecure environmental web characterizing the West African sub region. Kieh 
and Kalu (2013) similarly observe that the sub region is identified by weak, and 
ungoverned borders, drug, and human trafficking, political instability, illicit proliferation 
of small and light weapons, mal development, precariously prolonged conflicts, cross-
border criminal gangs, terrorists, Islamist militants, and weak borders, inter alia. To add to 
that the (sub) region’s proximity to South America via sea, coupled with weak maritime, 
and air space security expose the coast of West Africa, and the Gulf of Guinea to 
transnational criminals, and drug syndicates. Additionally, the unemployed (youths) 
succumb to influence of such groups in their quest to secure wealth, resources, and better 
lives, and therefore engage in nefarious activities (41 cite). Furthermore, the inter, and 
intra-religious conflicts and tensions defining West Africa has created divisions which 
terrorist groups can exploit, and explore. The upsurge in the number of these Islamist 
groups in that part of the world highlights the fact that the (sub) region is relatively weak, 
porous, and accommodating for terrorism, terrorists, and terrorist-related activities. These 
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perennial challenges of the (sub) region make nationals of countries within the 
geographical area impressionable to exploitation by terrorists. In this regard, there could 
be little doubt that radicalized individuals and groups could transport similar ideas to their 
home countries the result of which could be tantamount to no less than the formation of 
terrorists groups, attacks or terrorist-related incidences. 
In a related fashion, Adu, Afful, and Amartey assert that the porous borders of Ghana 
reflects that of the wider West African sub region and serves as a serious bottleneck 
burdening the operations of (border) security officials. The repercussions of this challenge 
cannot be overemphasized; they facilitate transnational organized crimes such as terrorism, 
proliferation of weapons, drugs, and arms, to mention a few. As Sosuh (2011), and  (Kieh 
& Kalu 2013) note, the consistent conflicts symptomatic of  the African continent, with 
their resultant ramifications of organized cross border crimes exacerbate the transnational 
threats to the security of states in the region. The fact that Ghana has experienced some 
impacts of political turbulence from Togo, Cote D,lvoire and Liberia Sosuh (2011) 
underscores the fact that Ghana remains vulnerable to the activities of BH, and events in 
Nigeria. An illustrative example is key to giving meaning to this assertion. The Global Risk 
Insights (2015) indicate the fact that the BH-ISIL recruits journeyed from Ghana to Nigeria 
without any detection by Ghana-Nigeria security agencies. This highlights the porosity of 
the Ghana-Nigeria borders, and by extension, the entire sub region. Nonetheless, this is not 
deny the difficulties characterizing the sophistication of modern terrorism. If this present-
day terrorism is sophisticated, the development also calls for a parallel reflection of 
counter-terrorism measures.  
It must however, be noted that Ghana’s risks arising from the influx of refugees into its 
territory, the unstable, and insecure environment of the West African sub region, and weak 
borders are issues that bother on border management, and Ghana has institutions to that 
effect. These institutions work to the best of their ability to ensure the safety, and security 
of the country. As part of their tasks, they collaborate, and coordinate with national, 
continental, and global institutions. The effectiveness, and efficiency of these institutions, 
and their officials have translated into momentous strides in their lines of operation. This 
has helped to counter some threats arising from transnational, and cross border 
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criminalities, porous, and unstable environment that characterize the (sub) region. 
Nevertheless, restraint on too much optimism is prudent. The institutions in Ghana are 
fraught with capacity challenges which (seldom) jeopardize their efficiency, and 
effectiveness. For example, issues of corruption, bribery, and nepotism are major problems 
burdening them. Though legislative, and institutional arrangements have been established 
to deal with terrorism, and other related transnational organized crimes, commitments by 
governments, institutional authorities, and stakeholders to implement their provisions have 
been minimal (Sosuh 2011). There is therefore a gap between policies, and the commitment 
to implement same.  A number of records lend credence to this. For instance, Government’s 
anti-human trafficking support translated into 0.7% of its total capital generated for such 
operations in 2009 (all Africa.com cited in (Sosuh 2011). Moreover, the lack of the 
country’s “institutional structures” weakens its compliance, and commitments to the 
dictates of global border crime legislation (ibid.). Not to talk of the lack of logistics among 
the various security agencies which tends to hamper their progress. Even when such 
logistics were in existence, they were either obsolete or in limited use. For example, the 
strengths of PISCES and Scanners used at the country’s borders are limited; and the 
efficiency of those equipment at major points of entry including those of the country’s 
foremost Airport, and other borders at Aflao, Elubo, and Harbours at Tema and Tarkoradi 
are poor (Sosuh 2011). These weaknesses are further exacerbated by the reluctance of some 
citizens to release credible information necessary for arrest, investigations and consequent 
conviction by the police, intelligence and other security personnel counteract smooth 
counter terrorism operations. Such practice on the part of the populace has the tendency to 
jeopardize the security of the state. Other challenges include the lack of prosecution of 
suspects, bureaucracy, impediments, and interference from high-ranking officials, 
language barrier (at the borders owing to French-speaking neighbours), poor salary, and 
honorarium, and the lack of cooperation, and collaboration among national and 
international institutions (Sosuh 2011 p. 29). Though efforts put by governments, and other 
stakeholders to arresting the challenges, are commendable, they have not been adequate 
enough to deal with the situation. As a consequence, their efforts have suffered following 
the gap between promise and performance, rhetoric and reality since such challenges have 
been perennial, and deeply-rooted, and that their continuous existence endanger state 
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security in immeasurable proportions. Given this situation, the scale of Ghana’s 
susceptibility to the threat of terrorism, and other transnational organized crime may not 
be minimal. 
As if that is not enough, the threat is properly projected by the rot of corruption at Ghana’s 
borders (Heritage 2006; Integrity & Feigenblatt 2009; Koranteng & Abdulai 2012; Mark 
2015; Modern Ghana 2015). Corruption is “…an illegal payment to a public agent to obtain 
a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of pay offs” (Rose-Ackerman 
2002). Transparency International (2014) defines it “…[as] the abuse of entrusted power 
for private gain”. Corruption at the borders enhance the passage of criminals, and 
criminalities within and without Ghana. In this respect, terrorists, and other dangerous 
groups and individuals may find their ways in the country to execute their missions. From 
this perspective, unsuspecting Ghanaians could be influenced to advance the ends of these 
terrorists. Despite the endemic corruption canker in the country, some citizens have 
distinguished themselves by remaining adamants to the temptations that accompany the 
phenomenon. Furthermore, various private and government bodies have been instituted to 
nib the canker in the bud. At least, these counter arrangements potentially provide some 
timely relief, or respite, and probably reduces the incidence of the phenomenon which 
offers some hope and optimism. However, their existence in great measure may mean that 
they would remain threat pro tempore, and would require relentless time, and efforts at 
mitigating, and perhaps eradicating same. 
Similar to weak borders, cum corruption is the lack of equipment used by the immigration, 
customs officials, and other internal and external security authorities. This flaw which was 
revealed by Adu, Afful, and Amartey is strengthened by observations made by (Sosuh 
2011). She asserts that there is the general lack of infrastructure and facilities needed for 
effective security operations along Ghana’s borders. This affirms Aning, and Yankah’s 
assertions that the poor anti-terrorism infrastructure of the country reflects the lack of 
appreciation for the threats posed by contemporary terrorists, and terrorism. This limitation 
renders counter terrorism operations counter-productive owing to ineffective services of 
border authorities occasioned by the lack of appropriate accoutrements, hence, fostering 
and festering the activities of terrorists the result of which could culminate in domestic, 
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and transnational terrorism in the country. However, caution against too much pessimism 
is prudent. The sophistication of modern terrorism, and its resultant global surge has 
perhaps informed Ghana to rethink its conception of the phenomenon. As the Custom 
Official, Adu, Amankwah, and Afful indicated, Ghana is strengthening, and stepping up 
its measures against terrorism by providing the needed equipment, logistics, and organizing 
intermittent security training, and courses, seminars, and retreats. Though these efforts are 
seldom hampered by constraints, they may nonetheless reduce the threats, and incidence 
of terrorism in the country. However, the rampant spate of contemporary terrorist attacks 
across the globe means that stringent counter measures are required, and the fundamental 
problems of inadequate equipment, logistical, operational, and tactical resources will do 
little to assist when perpetrators of the phenomenon beckon in Ghana. 
Additionally, the ECOWAS protocol border policy (979) which was designed to foster 
integration within the sub region is viewed by almost all the respondents as being 
counterproductive, which further exposes Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. 
This thinking is pivoted on the fact that the protocol has turned into a white elephant 
facilitating cross-border crimes in the sub region. The ill functioning of the ECOWAS 
protocol on the free movement of people and goods is hampered by lack of education, and 
poor functioning of state institutions negatively affects its implementation (Sosuh 2011).  
This undoubtedly undermines border security, and paves way for criminals including 
terrorists into the country. How does a policy which was initiated on good grounds to 
facilitate, for example, integration and trade, among member states serve to defeat the very 
purpose for which it was established? In the first place, despite the fact that the policy 
abolishes visa requirements of citizens of member states, it nonetheless requires same to 
possess a valid travel document and an international health certificate (Protocol A/P.1/5/79, 
1979) cited in (Bamfo 2013). In this respect, the violation of the policy does not take place 
in a vacuum but suffers the scourge of corruption by (some) border officials, who seek their 
selfish interest at the state’s expense. In this light, these officials, and their accomplices 
threaten the security of Ghana.  
Furthermore, the lack of inter-agency collaboration, cooperation, and communication at 
national and transnational levels, as highlighted by Afful, render Ghana’s counter 
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terrorism, and other security efforts ineffective. Sosuh (2011 p. 29) notes that the “lack of 
collaboration and cooperation between the (border) agencies [in Ghana] and their [Nigerian 
counterparts] impedes their ability to provide fast and efficient services”. Similarly, the 
lack of same ultimately jeopardizes Ghana’s counter terrorism measures.  Nevertheless, the 
fact that the country has transnational, and global counter terrorism collaboration and 
cooperation is a step in the right direction since the nature of terrorism requires 
collaborative efforts. However, once Ghana has formally initiated the need to collaborate 
to achieve set targets, it must live up to expectations, especially when it is an issue of 
national security. Notwithstanding that, one cannot lose sight of the challenges such 
institutions battle with. These institutions are managed by man and are therefore prone to 
errors, and are (seldom) beset with logistical, resource, and other constraints which fall far 
short of their control. However, these challenges do not entirely excuse the level of 
inaction, and rhetoric by some government officials, professional authorities, and other key 
holders. In this light, the lack of institutional cooperation and collaboration between Ghana, 
and say Nigeria, threaten their counter terrorism efforts. 
The findings also identified money laundering and financial terrorism as security 
challenges underscoring Ghana’s vulnerability to the phenomenon of terrorism. Amartey 
indicated that the difficulty in combatting financial terrorism in Ghana hampered the fight 
against terrorism. His observation was strengthened by the findings by (Sosuh 2011). 
“Money laundering is the generic term used to describe the process by which criminals 
disguise the original ownership and control of the proceeds of criminal conduct by making 
such proceeds appear to have derived from a legitimate source” (ICA n.d) . The term has 
nexus with any illegitimate profit generating-venture such as financial terrorism, illegal 
trafficking of drugs, arms, and people, extortion, and kidnapping, tax evasion and fraud, 
and especially corruption”(Chaikin & Sharman 2009). The menace is difficult to combat 
given the subtle, secrecy, and the perpetrators involved (Chaikin & Sharman 2009; Sosuh 
2011). This corroborates the assertion made by Amartey to the effect that combating 
financial terrorism in Ghana is difficult owing to the difficulty in detecting legitimate 
monies from illegitimate ones. Sosuh (2011 p. 6) observes that money laundering 
constitutes a relatively minimal threat in Ghana. Juxtaposing the ‘difficulty in detecting the 
phenomenon’ in Ghana, and its perceived minimal threat in same raises the question of 
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how the two affect each other. If it is difficult/easy to unravel the nature it takes, it may 
partly affect the level of perceived threat it poses to Ghana. Which probably holds that the 
easier it is detected by the mandated authorities, the more credible its threats’ assessment 
may be. However, the fact that it is recognized globally as a phenomenon which has proven 
difficult to combat underscores the assertions of both sources26. Nevertheless, its 
sophisticated form requires a corresponding significant, and rigorous counter measures. 
Despite its rather lower threatening level as argued by (Sosuh 2011),  a report produced by 
GIABA 27on Ghana’s efforts in Anti-Money Laundering and the Combating of Terrorism 
Financing (AML/CTF) in 2008, paints a different picture. The report revealed the 
following, inter alia; First, Ghana witnessed an upsurge in the buying of dear residential 
apartments which followed instant payment of US dollars in cash; second, Ghana had a 
weak Anti Money Laundering, and financial terrorism measures, and poor public 
knowledge on same (Sosuh 2011). Though Ghana has anti-money laundering, and counter 
terrorism institutions which “…carry out day to day coordination and investigation of 
terrorist crimes” (Ewi & plessis 2012 p. 1021), such institutions are dull (Hutchful 2007 p. 
118). This lack of public knowledge on the phenomenon, coupled with the lax, poor, and 
low profile measures leave Ghana at the mercy of terrorism, and its threats. 
Additionally, Ghana’s involvement in foreign (military) interventions is identified by 
Kakraba, as an avenue which exposes the latter to security threats, and heightens the 
country’s risks to the pangs of terrorism. The country has troops in Mali,  Cote D’Ivoire 
South Sudan,  Liberia  (ModernGhana 2013; UN DPKO 2010). UN DPKO (2010) ranked 
Ghana sixth among the top twenty troop contributors to UN Peacekeeping Operations as 
at February 28, 2010.  Whilst Somalia-based Al-Shabaab, and Mali-based Ansar dine, have 
a history of launching attacks against countries whose troops oppose them, it is not 
impossible for Ghana to be among those countries probably listed as (potential) targets by 
the terrorist groups. Though not directly related to terrorism, the early stages of Liberia's 
civil war witnessed what could be viewed today as an Al-Shabaab strategy of retaliation in 
response to foreign (‘military’) intervention. In August 1990, in retaliation for Ghana's 
                                                          
26 Amartey, and (Sosuh 2011) 
27  Inter - Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering and Terrorism Financing in West Africa (GIABA) 
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participation in a West African peacekeeping force (which had tried but failed to stop the 
fighting), Taylor's troops slaughtered 1,000 Ghanaian immigrants in one day in the 
Liberian village of Marshall (Boutwell & Klare 2000). Though Taylor’s troops were not 
terrorists, they adopted a strategy and style that is consistent with modern day modus 
operandi of terrorists. From the foregoing, Ghana could be said to be predisposed to 
retaliation by terrorists28.  This assertion is underlined by a security analyst in Ghana, 
Emmanuel Sowatey who has argued that “Once you are sending troops, you'll have to have 
an intense change in national security structure because if the president makes certain 
commitment and comments at the UN, the AU and the (ECOWAS), and makes 
pronouncements against certain terrorist groups, there are likely implications’ 
(ModernGhana 2013). He therefore stressed the need for adjustment in Ghana’s domestic 
security arrangements to reflect current security developments in the face of growing 
attacks from Al Shabaab “…since the country [Ghana] was contributing to peacekeeping 
efforts across the world”, in addition to efforts and pronouncements made by former 
ECOWAS Chair, and current President of Ghana against BH. It could be argued that 
Ghana’s vulnerability to (retaliatory) attacks by terrorists is heightened in terms of its 
foreign interventions when argued from the standpoint that countries who may not be 
involved in military interventions have one way or the other suffered some casualties in 
the hands of terrorists or their activities. This stems from the fact that ISIS captured and 
brutally murdered some Japanese and Chinese citizens, whose countries are not belligerent 
parties to the anti-ISIS joint strikes in Syria, and Iraq. 
From the foregoing, it could be deduced that terrorists could strike at any country at any 
given time. The situation highlights the fact that terrorism has undoubtedly featured as an 
international phenomenon which threatens global peace and security. From this 
perspective, it may be essential for countries to take proactive measures to combat the 
crime via means not limited to foreign interventions, even if those countries may not have 
immediate strategic interests. This is because whether countries intervene militarily or 
otherwise, they still face threats by terrorists except that the extent of the threat varies.   
                                                          
28 Such as BH and Al Shabaab 
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Furthermore, the lack of education, sensitization, awareness and security consciousness 
among the citizenry, identified by the respondents further expose Ghana to the horrors of 
terrorism. This general weakness among the populace evidences itself in the lack of 
appropriate anti-terrorism infrastructure, lack of visible national and public discourse on 
the issue of terrorism, and the seeming lack of interrogative nature among Ghanaians on 
counter terrorism, and other security-related issues. Among other things. To a large degree, 
these speak volumes of the lack of general appreciation of the threats and throes of 
terrorism on the part of particularly counter terrorism officials, policy makers, and 
authorities of state security institutions. The result of this shortcoming may not be far-
fetched; first, it (could) enhance the fostering of terrorism, and terrorist-related incidence 
in the country; second, it could heighten the susceptibility of the citizenry to the menace; 
third, it could give grounds for terrorists and their associates to exploit the ignorance of the 
people, to say the least. However, when the citizenry are sensitized, and informed of the 
phenomenon, their awareness may prompt them to be more meticulous, remain security-
conscious, equip them to question suspicious characters, and events, and these may largely 
help save lives, and properties in the long run, all things being equal. However, it could 
also be argued that the lack of sensitization, public education, and discourse on the 
phenomenon is perhaps the result of conscious restriction of information flow as a strategic 
approach adopted by counter terrorism officials in dealing with the issue. This may be true 
given the fact that issues of terrorism, and its related incidences could spark public fear, 
and insecurity. And these may have repercussions for activities of the state, and the citizens. 
If this stance is anything to go by, the ensuing public fear when not handled properly might 
jeopardize state security and render anti-terrorism operations self-defeating to some extent. 
In this light, it may be proper for counter terrorism efforts to remain covert for purposes of 
intelligence, and national security concerns. That notwithstanding, the fact that civilians 
exclusively remain targets of terrorists’ attacks should underpin the former’s engagement 
in all counter terrorism measures and policies. This would to a greater measure inhibit the 
occurrence of the phenomenon, and its pangs. In this way, it could be contended that a 
good anti-terrorism measure/policy has an important feature of involving the citizenry in 
all material matters of human, and state security. The concern that public education could 
instigate fear within the country could be settled by a cautious dissemination of 
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information, and public education, sensitization and discourse. And for the fact that at 
present, poor preparation in areas of public broadcast concerning the phenomenon partly 
defines the country’s response to same and underscores its very vulnerability. 
In addition to the above is the issue of the desirability of Ghanaians to report criminal and 
criminal activities to security agencies. According to Afful, the lack of cooperation, and 
the reluctance of some Ghanaian citizens to relay credible information to effect arrest of 
criminals posed a serious security threat to the country. However, his observation conflicts 
with that of the security analyst who posits that Ghanaians are generally enthused to report 
criminals and criminal activities. Notwithstanding these disparities, it is worthy to 
recognize the fact that state security and stability requires collaborative efforts by all and 
sundry.  Arguably, a self-policing state may be more secure than the reverse given the joint 
cooperation among security agencies and the citizens towards averting the occurrence of 
crime. To the extent that security bodies are battling with institutional challenges, coupled 
with the lack of security consciousness among the populace, there could be little pessimism 
about the safety and security of the Ghanaian state in the face of challenges such as weak 
borders as posited by Afful, and underscored by (Sosuh 2011).  
Last but not least, the successful infiltrations by members of BH into Yemen, Mali, and 
Somalia accentuate the threats Ghana faces with respect to the former. For example, some 
respondents indicated that an AQIM bomb expert, a supreme sharia court judge of Ghana-
Nigeria descent resident in Nigeria, and the Nigerian failed panty-bomber of a US-bound 
plane (Captain Brachie 2014; CBS News 2010; Ghanaweb 2015e) successfully entered the 
country [Ghana] without detection by security officials. These infiltrations raise several 
security questions, and further heighten Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism. 
Firstly, it shows how porous, and lax the security checks at the Ghanaian borders are. It 
also stresses the lack of Ghana-Nigeria cooperation and collaboration vis-à-vis security and 
intelligence. Third, their successful entry into Ghana arguably sheds some light on the issue 
of corruption/underhand dealings on the part of (border) security officials. Additionally, it 
could be argued that the mere presence of these terrorists in Ghana had prospects of 
endangering the State’s security. For example, they (might) have influenced, trained, or 
radicalized their acquaintances in Ghana; second, they could have perpetrated horrendous 
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attacks in Ghana. However, the research findings do not have any evidence that these 
personalities acted in a manner that tragically impacted Ghana’s Security. Nevertheless, in 
the case of the US panty bomber, Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab detonated his suicide vest 
with bomb when he mounted his Detroit bound-plane. This perhaps shows clearly that he 
could have probably detonated the bomb during his stay in Ghana if he had rescinded his 
decisions based on any possible circumstance or reason.  
That notwithstanding, Omar Farouk Abdul Mutallab evaded advanced border security 
measures in Amsterdam and successfully enplaned to detonate the Detroit-bound Plane but 
to no avail. This speaks volumes of the sophistication of present day terrorism which 
accordingly calls for stringent measures. Nevertheless, whilst mounting searing and 
scathing criticisms, and condemnations of the rots, and inefficiencies that expose the 
country to surmountable security deficiencies, Ghana’s security personnel deserve a pat on 
the back for the monumental feats they have chalked in their operations as evidenced in 
the interception of weapons by Ghanaian security officials following the recent Cote 
D’ivoire crisis (Ato 2011). This underpins the need for proper training, equipment, and 
motivation of security personnel for the provision of better effective and efficient services. 
Additionally, since some of these success stories are kept from the public domain for 
intelligence, and national security concerns, the public become oblivious of them, and 
therefore tend to lack a good appreciation of efforts made by these personnel. 
Similarly, the fact that BH members had in previous times successfully disguised 
themselves as Fulani herdsmen and had entered Mali, and Niger, to execute their missions 
threaten Ghana’s security in the area of terrorism as asserted by Afful, and corroborated by 
(Sosuh 2011). This assertion is made following Ghana’s infiltrations by Fulani herdsmen 
from Niger, Mali and Chad through illegitimate routes (Bamfo 2013; Sosuh 2011) 
sometimes without detection by border authorities. Again, such phenomenon 
predominantly takes place at the northern part of the country, which has seen increasing 
levels of Islamic religious radicalization, chieftaincy disputes, ethno-tribal tensions, cum 
endemic poverty, and other socio-economic, and political challenges.  
In the face of illegal entry by the herdsmen, Ghana’s (border) security officials have been 
able to make some strides in averting incidences of such. The border between Ghana, and 
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Togo witnessed the arrest of five Fulani herdsmen and their 700 cattle, and were 
consequently returned to Togo on charges of illegal entry by the Ghana Immigration 
officials (IRIN 2010 cited in (Sosuh 2011). Nevertheless, the short comings of the security 
agencies in dealing with the phenomenon of Fulani herdsmen owing to their adverse 
security implications on the country prompted the nation’s law-making body to delve into 
the issue. At the floor of Parliament, one Member of Parliament (MP) reacted 
“If our national security has not been able to handle this problem, then one day if a country 
invades Ghana, what will they do? Because these are untrained Fulani herdsmen taking 
care of cattle, holding AK-47, raping our women, killing our people and we cannot handle 
that situation. So why should this House continue to approve budget and many other things 
for people who claim to be handling security? Please this is a serious matter and we should 
demand that a special action program is put before us for people to explain why they are 
unable to handle this matter” MP for Okere, Dan Botwe suggested (Ghana-mps.gov.gh 
2010).  
Therefore, given the fact that some members of BH have been successful in penetrating the borders 
into Mali, Nigeria, and Niger; punctuated with the difficulties in detecting the entry of these 
herdsmen in Ghana, as well as their possibility to influence Ghanaians upon their successful entry, 
inform the thinking that Ghana is potentially at risk of BH infiltration, ideological influence and 
terrorist attacks.  
SPEAR Factors Influencing the prospects for Domestic Terrorism in Ghana? 
At this juncture, it is necessary to deliberate on the SPEAR factors indicated by the respondents, 
on how they affect the possibilities for domestic terrorism in Ghana. 
Respondents indicated a number of factors which are not limited to (poverty, relative and economic 
inequality, poor economic development), poor governance/leadership/lack of transparency and 
accountability, corruption, unemployment, dangerous politics (political sponsorship to cause 
mayhem, vituperations, flaunting of wealth, “winner-take-all”), Gun running, (violent) religious 
radicalization issues pertaining to the electronic and print media.  
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Analysis and Discussion 
Respondents identified poverty as one of socio-economic factors which could partly influence 
domestic terrorism in Ghana. Aning and Abdallah (2013) have identified Poverty as a phenomenon 
which is generally thriving in Ghana. Nevertheless, the phenomenon is relatively rife in the 
Northern part of the country and has persisted since colonial era (ibid.). Lipton and Ravallion 
(1993) define Poverty as a situation which “…exists when one or more persons fall short of a level 
of economic welfare deemed to constitute a reasonable minimum, either in some absolute sense or 
by the standards of a specific society”. The  World Health Organization (2014) considers the 
phenomenon as an umbrella term which encompasses all manner of problems that threaten the 
health, and survival of humans. The July 2013 report on population and housing census suggests 
a higher poverty level and widespread deprivation in Ghana, particularly in the three northern 
regions. The overall proportion of multidimensional poverty in Ghana is around 20% (UNDP 
2014) and about 28.5% live below the poverty line (The World Bank 2014). Nevertheless, various 
interventions have been made by the incumbent, and previous governments to arrest the poverty 
situation through job creation, and other interventions. The National Health Insurance Scheme, the 
National Youth Employment Program the Savanna Accelerated Development Authority (Ministry 
of Food and Agriculture 2015) are evidence of such interventions. However, efforts by government 
have proved inadequate given the fact that the country has been declared HIPC by the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF).  
It could be argued that whilst the mere presence of poverty may not necessarily generate terrorism, 
it offers fertile grounds for the less endowed to be exploited through financial assistance offered 
by unsuspecting terrorists. In this regard, the rising incidence of poverty in Ghana constitutes 
threats since it has the potential to influence poor people in to it. Contrarily, it could be contended 
that the rising poverty levels in Ghana could do little to affect some less privileged people to 
engage in the phenomenon. This position is predicated on grounds that not all poor people could 
fall for financial inducements to engage in terrorism. At the same time, the rich in Ghana could 
engage in the phenomenon as well. However, in relative terms, it could be argued that poverty in 
Ghana could heighten the poor’s vulnerability to exploitation than the rich. Given the rising levels 
of religious radicalization in the midst of growing incidence of poverty, there is the tendency for 
Ghana to suffer from the pangs of terrorism if care is not taken. A critical consideration of events 
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in Northern Ghana offers some credibility to the assertion. The relatively rife poverty levels, ethnic 
clashes, and a fledgling religious radicalization provides potentials for domestic terrorism in the 
country. For instance, the BH-ISIS recruitment incidence in Ghana offers a striking example of 
poverty as a catalyst for terrorism. The report by Global Risk Insights (2015) does not 
underestimate the role of poverty in the incidence. It notes that “While youths from both rich and 
poor backgrounds are known to have been recruited by ISIS, ‘the recruits’ are purportedly 
promised luxurious lives when they get to Syria and Iraq, as well as assurance of quality life for 
their immediate family members back at home. This is an offer Ghanaian young men and young 
women are finding difficult to refuse, especially youths from the majority: northern Ghanaian 
Muslims…” 
Another bottleneck burdening the country, and affecting its tendency for domestic terrorism is 
poor governance. The  Business Dictionary (2015) defines ‘governance’ as ‘the establishment of 
policies, and continuous monitoring of their proper implementation, by the members of the 
governing body of an organization. It includes the mechanisms required to balance the powers of 
the members (with the associated accountability), and their primary duty of enhancing the 
prosperity and viability of the organization. Fukuyama (2013) defines the term as {… as 
government’s ability to make and enforce rules and to deliver services …”.  This means that the 
term extends to the quality of leadership, nature of policies, and the political will to execute laid 
down policies. It also involves transparency and accountability. Werlin (2003) asserts that there is 
a general weakness in Ghana’s governance. Sandbrook and Oelbaum (1997) argue that the 
widespread cronyism in Ghana’s governance have resulted in “corruption” thereby affecting 
government institutions. Similarly, Adarkwah-Yiadom (2013) asserts that poor governance in 
Ghana amplify “poverty”, and “corruption”. Following the conduct of a project in Ghana by 
“Democracy International” on behalf of United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), the project’s findings indicated that the domineering power of the executive arm of 
Ghana’s government which is engendered by the Supreme Law of the Land, hampers 
“accountability, transparency, and responsiveness” (Democracy International 2011). Despite these 
concerns about the current nature of Ghana’s governance, a report on Ghana’s performance of 
Africa’s Peer Review Mechanism (APRM), by the Renewal (2006), gives mixed accounts. It 
observes that “The report praises Ghana for holding three successful elections since the restoration 
of multiparty democracy in 1992, including a peaceful transition between parties and presidents in 
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2000. …. [Praised Ghana’s] “Unique institutions” of governance, among other things. 
Nevertheless, the “…report criticized the large size of the cabinet…which undermined the 
separation of powers between members of parliament, between the executive and the legislature; 
…restricted the independence of the judiciary, and [featured] the “interference” of the executive 
in court cases…”. The report was premised on a wide range of components constituting the 
“APRM’s notion of governance” which cut across all segment of the country such as “political 
power to business, the media, civil society and local communities”. 
However, poor governance could generate distasteful results for the country. It could lead to the 
loss of trust and legitimacy of the state and its institutions in the eyes of the citizenry. This may 
result in situations where affected individuals could resort to illegitimate means to address their 
discontentment. Such discontentment may also arise from their sense of politico-socio-economic 
alienation. As a consequence, they could be exploited by terrorist groups. Since the mere existence 
of poor governance may not be enough to influence terrorism, it could be argued that the rising 
incidence of radicalization could fan the incidence of domestic terrorism in Ghana. (Botha 2008 
p. 39) has argued that [poor] governance does not only have a “direct” effect on domestic terrorism, 
but it impacts remotely on transnational terrorism as well.  His assertion gives credence to the 
Nigerian situation where the lack of credible institutions, and poor governance have partly given 
grounds for BH to take the law into their own hands by opposing, and fighting to unseat the 
government rather than resolving its grievances with the appropriate state institutions. Though 
frantic efforts put by the Ghana government to improving its governance record is commendable, 
a lot needs to be done. 
In addition to the above is the issue of corruption. Corruption is a socio-economic problem that 
has crept into the inner core of the Ghanaian society despite proclaimed attempts by successive 
governments in dealing with the problem since time immemorial. Corruption is “…an illegal 
payment to a public agent to obtain a benefit that may or may not be deserved in the absence of 
pay offs” (Rose-Ackerman 2002). Transparency International (2014) defines the term “… [as] the 
abuse of entrusted power for private gain”. Although the World Bank data on corruption indicator 
suggests Ghana’s progression from the 50th to the 75th percentile in the last five to six years, other 
indicators like the Bertelsmann Transformation index and Afro Barometer indicate no remarkable 
improvement (Agbele 2011). Consequently, varied sources have indicated that there is lack of trust 
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in the incumbent government’s handling of corruption-related issues, just as the business industry 
deems the menace as a hindrance to conducting business in Ghana (Business Anti-Corruption 
Portal 2014).  The overt display of corruption and the willingness to corrupt, both at the lower and 
higher levels (Tweneboah-Koduah 2014) makes the canker even more serious since the 
environment in Ghana facilitates corruption (Ghana Anti-Corruption Coalition and the National 
Governance Programme 2006). Socio-economic policies initiated by governments, both past, and 
present, have been hit by strings of corruption scandals (Modern Ghana 2015; Multimedia Group 
Limited 2014; MYJoyonline.com 2014). According to a recent research conducted by the Centre 
for Democratic Development (CDD),  “three-quarters of Ghanaians regarded corruption as a 
serious problem, with 80 per cent feeling it had worsened over previous years” (CDD cited in 
(Renewal 2006). These, and many others lend credence to the fact that the canker takes several 
forms, at several areas, in different institutions. That notwithstanding, a number of anti-corruption 
agencies and institutions have been established by way of curbing the malady. They include the 
Commission on Human Rights and Administrative Justice (CHRAJ), the Ghana Integrity initiative 
(GII), and a host of others. Nevertheless, recent allegations of corruption scandals in the judiciary 
is probably a clear indication that the phenomenon is deeply rooted in the country (Ghanaweb 
2015d; Modern Ghana 2015). The ramifications of the phenomenon cannot be overemphasized; 
first, it hampers a country’s growth and development; it makes institutions lose credibility, and 
legitimacy; it widens the gap between the rich, and the poor; and not least, it fosters criminal 
activities, and violence. Owing to these negative developments, there could be little doubt that the 
adverse phenomenon could lead some individuals in the country to feel relatively deprived as they 
compare themselves with others, owing to the gap that has been created by the structural problem 
of corruption. They may therefore be influenced by individuals, and groups who identify 
themselves with common grievances to join hands, and resort to illegitimate means of addressing 
the problem since they might have lost trust in the institutions which had been established to deal 
with the canker. By committing their human resource, strategic and tactical expertise arising from 
their de jure and de factor membership, they are set to champion their socio-politico-economic and 
religious actions to press home their demands, thereby giving credence to the theory of social 
movement.  This is buttressed by events in Nigeria which has been partly attributed to corruption. 
For instance, Global Risk Insights (2015) and (ghanaweb 2015c) report that one of the Ghanaians 
recruited into ISIL , Nazir Nortei Alema, cited endemic corruption and democracy in Ghana, as 
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factors informing his decision to join the terrorist group; the extract read in part, “…I told you a 
lie to please my Allah. The deception was to go do some research work in faraway Prestea while 
the main idea was to move far away from you all to the Islamic State (IS). I know it might sound 
kind of crazy for you but your son really had to take this bold step to get out of the corrupt system 
of Ghana which has democracy first on its list,” (ghanaweb 2015c). The incidence affirms 
corruption as a factor facilitating Ghana’s vulnerability to threat of terrorism.  
Furthermore, the unemployment situation in Ghana has the prospect to aid domestic terrorism in 
the country. Unemployment is defined as “the share of the labor force that is without work but 
available for and seeking employment” (The World Bank 2014). In the year 2000, the 
unemployment rate in Ghana equaled 11%, (U. S Central Intelligence Agency 2014), and it 
averaged from 12.05% in 2001 to a record high of 12.90%  in 2014 (Bank of Ghana 2014). The 
unemployment situation is widely evident in geographical locations where there are disparities and 
inequalities (Adarkwa 1992) . “…the major spatial inequalities in Ghana are the north-south, the 
rural-urban and the rural-rural dichotomies Tsikata & Seini cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013). The 
situation is at its worst in the three northern regions of Ghana (ibid.).  “Whereas employment has 
been relatively low in Ghana, there is potential for increased unemployment given that macro-
economic growth has dropped below the average of at least 8% since 2013 and currently stands at 
3.9 per cent” (Global Risk Insights 2015). However, despite the situation, a number of 
interventions have been introduced by successive governments, to curtail the problem. Especially 
in the three northern regions where poverty is endemic, Scholarship schemes have been instituted, 
jobs have been created, and a number of them, including the incumbent President, enjoy enviable 
positions in all spheres of the (Ghanaian) life. Nonetheless, unemployment still remains a major 
issue in Ghana. It could be argued that whilst unemployment in itself may not necessarily push 
people into terrorism, unemployed people could be influenced by elements to engage in terrorist 
activities. This could be seen from the standpoint where unemployment culminates in poverty, 
which makes some poor people gullible to influence in their quest to satisfy their ends. 
Commenting on the recent incidence of terrorism in the country, a retired captain indicated that 
“When you have between 50% and 60% of the unemployed being the youth, who are between 24 
and 35, it’s a huge risk…” (ghanaweb 2015a; ghanaweb 2015f). 
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A major concern shared among the respondents pertained to the issue of the youth and 
unemployment. A couple of definitions have been given for what constitutes youth. However, a 
common component of the definition underlines the fact that the youth are relatively younger than 
their adult counterparts. The Oxford Dictionaries (2015) defines youth as the period between 
childhood and adult age; or simply, a young man. The youth have been important targets, and 
source of recruitments for terrorists groups. A close observation may reveal that the youth form a 
good component of terrorist cells. Arguably, it may be difficult for some youth to resist or remain 
intractable to the various strategies employed by terrorists owing to the fact such strategies are 
cleverly crafted to expose unsuspecting victims to succumb directly or indirectly, consciously or 
unconsciously, electronically, or otherwise, and in no small measure, socio-politico-economically, 
and religiously. Since terrorism does not necessarily take place in a vacuum, it could be contended 
that the youth who are relatively less endowed 29 as compared to their adult counterparts, 30fall 
preys to terrorists’ recruitments, and propaganda easier. It comes as no surprise that consistent 
calls are being made to engage the youth meaningfully, and productively through national 
discussions, provision of employment, education, among other interventions. The phenomenal 
engagement of the youth in violence poses an existential threat to the security, and stability of 
West African countries, where same is rife with needlessly naked violence, and civic unrests 
arising from political rivalry, and personal vendettas, which remotely facilitates the festering of 
terrorism. The ‘youth in violence’ phenomenon has been explored among some scholars; 
Braungart (1984) observes that most youths in West African countries have little to lose during 
[violence such as] civil wars because they are relatively less endowed compared to their older 
counterparts. Beyond Ghana, the conflicts in Sierra Leone, La Cote D’Ivoire and Liberia were 
sustained by the large number of young people who comprised about 95 percent of the nation’s 
populations (Aning & Atta-Asamoah 2011). During the civil conflicts between 1987 and 1997, the 
estimated number of weapons which were handled by the youth below eighteen years totaled 
between 6,000 and 15,000; a factor attributed to political, social, and economic marginalization 
(ibid.). Though Ghana has no such horrible experiences, it may nonetheless be gullible to similar 
situations when the existing conditions in Ghana are compared with the following observations 
made by Cincotta, cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013).  He observes that the different conceptions 
                                                          
29  Owing to poverty, unemployment, illiteracy 
30 Especially those in Africa 
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of the “youth” pertaining to Jihad which include the desire ‘To die in defense of Islam’; “To 
establish Sharia Law in Muslim-dominated states’, ‘To kill a non-Muslim for making derogatory 
remarks against Prophet Mohammed’, in addition to socio-economic problems such as alienation, 
poverty, and unemployment, inter alia could undermine the peace, tranquility, and stability of 
Ghana. Similarly, Moller (1967/68), cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013) argues that a skyrocketed 
number of youth could possibly threaten their respective countries on their way up into adulthood, 
especially in countries where opportunities for the youth is rare or almost non-existing. As a 
consequence, the youth in Ghana could fall prey to recruitments of terrorist organizations who 
seek to spread their ideologies of Jihadism, and Islamic extremism within the West African sub 
region, and beyond. This assertion is underlined by a disturbing (youth) unemployment situation, 
poverty, and the lack of other opportunities31. A fruitful institution of operational, and human 
resource capacities of BH within the sub region could influence the sections of the Ghanaian 
citizenry to engage in terrorism both within and without Ghana. This proposition finds some 
strength in the fact that BH’s merger with ISIS widens the group’s network base, and its 
propaganda machinery in their resolve for a potential regional agenda. In this case, Ghana, as well 
as others is not immune to their threats. Nevertheless, it could be contended that though such 
threats (potentially) exists, key institutions, and stakeholders are working tirelessly round the clock 
to remedy the situation. For example, the police, the intelligence, and perhaps more importantly 
the counter terrorism units, cum others are not relenting in their efforts to curtailing such incidence. 
Additionally, the government not unaware of the repercussions of (youth) unemployment, and 
poverty in general have, and continue to intervene socio-economically through the establishment 
of jobs, educational institutions, and other opportunities. However, so far as the country battles 
with pervasive SPEAR problems, they could spell doom for same if extreme caution is not taken. 
This contention finds some strength in the fact that the BH-ISIL recruits from Ghana were all 
youth, and the fact that “unemployment played an important role in their decision to join ISIL.  
Additionally, the nature of politics, and politicians in Ghana fan the possibilities for incidence of 
terrorism in the country. First, the “winner-takes-all” political system in Ghana where political 
parties that have been declared post-election victory take in charge of the governance and the 
management of all the states structures is a recipe for disaster. And especially when the victory 
                                                          
31 Detailed discussions appear later in the research 
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was premised on fraudulently tainted elections, much pessimism would persist about the state’s 
ability to continue enjoying its relative peace and stability. 
In a similar vein, the conduct of politicians is risky to the country’s security. When (some) 
politicians engage themselves in numerous corruptible ventures, and flaunt their wealth soon after 
assuming their political positions, relative deprivation, discontent, and grievances, inter alia among 
the less privileged and poor  become woefully affected. Such practice by politicians only deepen 
the woes of their  subjects, and makes conspicuous, the widening gap between the rich and the 
poor; where the rich minority enjoy at the expense of the poor majority. 
As if that is not enough, politicians in Ghana are noted for engaging in acts that tend to hostile 
their relationship with other opposing politicians, and political parties. This same conduct of some 
of Nigeria’s politicians, and political parties, as well as religious leaders, are known to have partly 
accounted for the emergence, and evolution of BH. With respect to Nigeria, some politicians, and 
religious leaders were believed to have championed their colloquial political, and religious 
interests via the provision of support, and funding to some Nigerian citizens who have evolved, 
and radicalized over time to be known at present as BH. Hence, the latter’s contribution to the 
evolution of the group. 
Moreover, in terms of Nigeria, observations of events pertaining to the realm of politics, and 
religion in Ghana point to a similar direction. Political parties and politicians are seen to organize 
groups of physically built youths/men during national, and parliamentary elections. Their act stems 
from their quest to advance their political interests; these ‘employees’ (are to) provide all forms of 
‘dirty’ ‘strategy’, ‘security’, ‘support’, and  ‘defense’ for their ‘employers’ (political parties). As 
a consequence, the former engage in the snatching of ballot boxes, physical, and verbal assaults of 
opposition political parties, inter alia. What is striking is that the hiring of these ‘private security’ 
by almost all the political parties is illegitimate, and illegal in the eyes of Ghana’s constitution. 
And not least, needless. Besides, the state (is obliged to) dispatches its relevant security apparatus 
to provide the needed security, support, and monitoring to achieve a free, fair, and transparent 
elections. Nevertheless, the (general) lack of trust in State institutions, including the electoral 
commission, coupled with (perceived) corruption, underhand dealings, among others, possibly 
inform the decisions of politicians to contravene the rules, some of which have faced the full rigors 
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of the law. Nevertheless, the implications of the aforesaid conditions for the nation’s security 
cannot be far-fetched.  
In terms of religion, some Sunni Muslims in the country are said to be propagating radical Islamic 
teachings, and doctrines. Not to mention the clashes and the friction that are generated owing to 
the propagation of different doctrinal precepts. And not least, the quest to dominate. As noted 
earlier, these developments have dire implications for the state especially when genuine grievances 
with political, and religious roots thrive. Radicalized groups may exploit the situation; influence 
their family, and friends. Same could as well be influenced by elements, and events in Nigeria to 
practice in Ghana, what they have learnt. This view is underscored by Botha, who has asserted that 
“Religion has a particular impact on the threat of transnational terrorism, for it enables 
disenchanted persons to recruit members across borders to their extreme views and actions” (Botha 
2008 p. 39). And since religious doctrinal differences and rivalries within West Africa constitute 
catalyst for (violent) radicalization (Ismail 2013 p. 239), Ghana could arguably be said to be at the 
mercy of the throes of terrorism.  
Last but not least, the influx of (SALW) in Ghana arguably exposes the country to incidence of 
terrorism. The threats partly lie in the fact that some of these weapons are locally, and illegally 
manufactured (F.A Nyarko, 2007 cited in (Aning & Abdallah 2013), whilst others are transported 
from other countries illicitly. Relatively, it could be observed that the amount of such weapons in 
the Ghanaian society is minimal compared to other States in the (sub) region (Aning & Abdallah 
2013); coupled with the fact that it is limitedly used in Ghana for social vices such as banditry, 
armed robbery, serial killings, and the likes (Antwi-Danso, interviewee). Therefore, their limited 
number, and usage for purposely perpetrating vices in Ghana inform Antwi-Danso to conclusively 
discount, and discredit their ‘huge’ impact or influence on the possibilities for terrorist actions in 
Ghana. However,  Aning and Abdallah (2013) note that “contrary to an initial estimate of 10,000, 
a 2006 baseline survey report in Ghana reported about 100,000 small arms circulating in the 
country (p. 115)”. The findings by Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 116) further indicate that “in every 
second house, [in Tamale, northern Ghana] SALW were available …”. 
One cannot underestimate the effects of SALW on a State’s security and stability. Among other 
things, they are used violently in conflict situations, the result of which are deaths, and 
displacements. Doubtlessly, it could be argued that the influx of SALW in Ghana have possible 
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implications for incidence of terrorism in the country since they could be exploited by extremists, 
and terrorist groups to advance their cause. Relatively, this is perhaps possible especially in 
(Northern) Ghana where poverty, ethno-tribal conflicts, and SALW are pervasive, and precarious. 
Aning and Abdallah (2013 p. 116) note some repercussions of violence accompanying the use of 
“small arms” in Ghana; They contend that “It will lend credence to the view that Muslims are 
terrorists, and since they represent a section of Ghana’s population, Ghana may be tagged as a 
terrorist breeding ground, hence detrimentally affecting Ghana’s relations with the international 
community”. In connection with the above, Antwi-Danso argued that the limited number of 
SALW, and their use for domestic purposes in Ghana does not serve as a source of terrorist threat 
to Ghana. Whilst Antwi-Danso contends that the relative illicit number of Small and illegal arms 
in Ghana are limited in number, and are used for are small in number and in the hands of few 
people. In Ghana, most of the illegal arms are manufactured locally. However, the few advanced 
ones are those that have fallen into bad hands, or are used by some quack security personnel to 
meet their ends. These illicit weapons are used for robbery, banditry, and private protection. Whilst 
these developments arguably pose lesser threats, they nonetheless offer favorable grounds for 
aggrieved, and radicalized elements to exploit, and champion their interests to their advantage.  
And that could have some diverse security ramifications not limited to terrorism for the country. 
These situations have produced opposing groups/movements who are disquiet about the existing 
socio-politico-economic conditions in Ghana. They include Alliance for Accountable Governance 
(AFAG), Committee for Joint Action (CJA), Let My Vote Count (LMVC), and other politically 
aggrieved pressure groups. To a larger degree, whilst the springing up of these groups with similar 
concerns portray the democratic dispensation of the country, nonetheless, it also speaks loudly of 
the general agitations with which the citizenry are battling with. A closer look leads to a cautious 
conclusion here. It cannot be ruled out that other elements with radicalized ideas, cum other factors 
that give grounds for further radicalization, and violence could exploit the situation in a way that 
could endanger the state’s security and stability through political violence which may not be 
limited to terrorism. Again, the unfavorable SPEAR conditions in the country constrain people’s 
prospects for the future, and might provide breeding grounds for recruiting the aggrieved to the 
terrorist cause. This finds some expression in the view  that the proliferation of politically 
aggrieved groups, and the spate of agitations on the labour front are a true manifestation of the 
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many challenges besetting Ghana, and that government must swiftly arrest them to avert possible 
escalation of incidence of civil unrests, and terrorism (ghanaweb 2015f).  
In a related development, the varying views of respondents on how they thought about the 
effectiveness of Ghana’s current counter terrorism measures deserve equal analysis, and 
discussion. This stems from the fact that effective anti-terrorism measures is key to assessing 
degrees of vulnerability, and threat levels. As it turned out, there were varied views regarding the 
effectiveness or otherwise of Ghana’s counter terrorism measures. Whilst others indicated the 
effectiveness of the current measures, the reverse was equally expressed.  
 It could be argued that the covert nature of counter terrorism operations makes it difficult for the 
citizenry to acquaint themselves with operational details. This is underpinned by the fact that 
information is restricted to the public for purposes of intelligence, and security. As a consequence, 
‘civilians’ may be oblivious of the current covert (operations), successes and setbacks recorded by 
intelligence, and counter terrorism officials. For instance, how do the public know if an imminent 
terrorist attack have been averted by officials? In this respect, since information about some of 
these measures are restricted to the public for security concerns, it leaves civilians oblivious of the 
situation. Nonetheless, since counter terrorism measures are not exclusively restricted to ‘covet’ 
actions and measures, but it is visible in areas of infrastructural developments/preparations, 
(public) education, and sensitization, it offers opportunity for assessments by security analysts, 
students, and other nonprofessional anti-terrorism officials.  Against this background, Ghana’s 
counter terrorism measures, though thought to be encouraging, needs to be upped especially when 
no amount of preparations could be deemed “adequate”; but a reasonable amount of preparations 
could possibly reduce the occurrence of the phenomenon, or mitigate its casualties when they 
occur. 
The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems 
(factors) in the country put undue strains or pressure on individuals or groups to engage in any 
means necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as 
compared to the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This 
development elicits discontentment and grievances, which culminates in a sense of socio-politico-
economic alienation, and marginalization. At this point, unreliable institutions, poor governance, 
and corruption, which translate into loss of state’s legitimacy and or its institutions inform 
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decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including terrorism) to 
press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the ideology, or 
recruitment, or propaganda of social movements, including terrorist organizations, whose 
ideologies, and cause may seem representative of their victims ‘concerns. Subsequently, they 
virtually emerge as de facto members of the ‘social movement’, sympathizing, and supporting the 
cause and ideology of their movement, and willing to execute same in their respective geographical 
locations. As a movement with de jure and de facto membership, they thrive on their collective 
human, logistical, operational, tactical and strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-
religious actions to achieve set targets, hence the theory of resource mobilization. Though the 
resource mobilization theory explains the springing up of strings of politically-aggrieved groups 
like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana, such groups are not terrorist groups, and do not possibly 
constitute threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, the theory is wholly reflective of the case in Nigeria 
where BH falls on diverse expertise of its de jure and de facto membership to advance their cause. 
This is seen in their merger with ISIS, training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), 
and Al-Shabaab.  
Analysis and Discussion of incidence of BH/ISIS-induced terrorism in Ghana  
In analyzing the situation, it is important that attention is given to the circumstances leading to the 
rise of BH, and factors leading to the recruitment of some graduates of the Kwame Nkrumah 
University Science and technology. Both scenarios highlight similar issues of corruption, poverty, 
unemployment, the insecurity of the West African sub region, and the transnational activities of 
BH, and ISIS, as factors leading to the success of the recruitment. 
The issue raises a number of concerns which reflected the findings. Firstly, the recruit’s reason for 
joining his ISIS expedition stems from his claims of endemic corruption, in Ghana which has been 
aided by “democracy”. His position could be linked to claims by BH which purports to be fighting 
to rid the Nigerian governments and beyond, of social ills including corruption, democracy, wide 
spread poverty, and unemployment. These are but a few problems which BH attributes to western 
civilization/education. The groups claims that formal education has rendered majority of 
uneducated Nigerians unemployed, and poor. This circumstance shows clearly that the Ghanaian 
ISIS recruits have been influenced by the ideologies of BH, its activities, and events in Nigeria. 
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Also indicative is the fact that socio-politico-economic, and religious problems could generate 
domestic, and transnational. In the above case, recruitments were made possible partly because 
such challenges were already existing in Ghana. Though, in the run up to their recruitment,  there 
were no (major) evidence of incidence of terrorism in Ghana, nevertheless, some of the current 
domestic issues in Ghana facilitated the recruits’ decisions to engage in transnational terrorism. 
This probably speaks volumes of the prospects of home grown terrorism in Ghana. At the 
transnational level, it has shown that existing challenges in Ghana made the recruits vulnerable to 
exploitation by the terrorists; a situation which was enhanced by the shared religion, the shared 
domestic challenges, and other similarities, not least, their influence on each other given their 
shared social and political outlooks. It has been established that the recruits were all Muslims that 
have been influenced via Islamic ‘doctrine’ by the seeming Islamic dominated groups of BH and 
ISIS. Since terrorists (may) use ‘religion’ as part of their propaganda machinery to achieve their 
‘instrumental’ aims of garnering, and gaining support, motivation, and influence (Collier 2006), it 
is similarly difficult to tell whether BH’s activities are informed by genuine Islamic doctrine, 
teachings, and practices. Additionally, the homogenous challenges of corruption, poverty, poor 
governance, etc. burdening Ghana, and Nigeria perhaps made the recruitments easier. And last but 
not least, the shared social, and political structure cum their cordial relationship, and proximity of 
Ghana and Nigeria were key to the rare success of the recruitment. 
Moreover, the fact that recruitment, and recruits came from Ghana, and their prospective training 
by BH is scheduled to take place in Niger, after which they would join the swelling ranks of ISIS 
in Iraq and Syria (Global Risk Insights 2015) betrays the transnational nature of the threats and 
vulnerability of Ghana to the phenomenon of terrorism. Niger is an immediate neighbor of Nigeria, 
and Ghana is relatively a little farther away from the former. Therefore, the recruitment from 
Ghana, and training of recruits in Niger underline the distant, and immediate threats, and 
susceptibility of those countries, respectively.  
Furthermore, it epitomizes the intensity of the risks owing to the insecurity situation in the West 
African sub region. Given its history of human, arms, and drug trafficking, as well as porous 
borders, there could be little doubt that such conditions facilitate, and exacerbate the risks of 
domestic, and transnational terrorism to Ghana. 
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Also, the situation deepens the transnational threats posed by BH, and the Islamic State groups in 
the (sub) region. Like ISIS, BH’s aims is to establish a state ruled by a single political and religious 
leader ‘according to Islamic law’. In this regard, the alliance, and support shared among these 
groups (Abdulai 2015; Hansen 2012; Iaccino 2015; Sergie & johnson 2015) in their quest to topple 
‘secular’ legitimate governments and replace same with Islamic regimes further heighten the 
danger posed to Ghana32 
The report also confirms the fact that northern Ghana remains relatively volatile, and a hot spot 
for domestic, and international terrorism. 
However, it must equally be noted that the government of Ghana is not relenting in its efforts to 
salvage the situation. Key interventions that have been employed include the creation of jobs, and 
schools. Also typical of the  intervention employed by the government to alleviate the socio-
economic problems of poverty, and cost of living include the government’s successful assistance 
from IMF’s support for Ghana’s financial and economic programs via the former’s Extended 
Credit Facility (ECF) mechanisms, and the World Bank's Partial risk Guarantee (PRG) programme 
to support investment in the Sankofa Gas Fields (Ghanaweb 2015g). These are geared towards 
reducing unemployment, and poverty situations following the onset of the “energy crisis” which 
occasioned redundancies, and retrenchments in the business sector of the country. 
Similarly, counter terrorism officials, security agencies and other appropriate bodies and 
stakeholders have stepped up their game since the issue broke out. For instance, the National 
Security has confirmed the report and raised an alarm of an agency in Ghana that was targeting 
and recruiting young Muslims from tertiary institutions to join ISIS (ghanaweb 2015c). The 
National Security Advisor said his outfit has unraveled that “…ISIS had a training base in Niger 
where recruits were trained as foreign terrorist instructors, adding that those who had joined the 
ISIS went through Burkina Faso or Nigeria” (cityfmonline 2015). Identification of the source of 
the problem is paramount to solving it. Additionally, it had warned the various media to exercise 
circumspection in their reportage revolving round the issue as it had repercussions for the State’s 
security and stability. These, and other covet preparations and operations are underway to salvage 
                                                          
32  See (Ogbonnaya et al. 2014) for the security implications of BH, and other terrorist groups for the (West African) 
sub region. 
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the situation. These and other counter terrorism measures which are ongoing corroborate responses 
from the security official, Alex Adu, Afful, Aku Shika Anim, and others.  
Additionally, the question of why Ghana has not yet recorded a (major) incidence of terrorism 
since time immemorial in the face of the aforesaid threats, and the fact that it has remained 
relatively peaceful and stable in West Africa perhaps underline the country’s relatively lower 
degree of vulnerability to the threats and throes of terrorism. Probably, the ‘secrets’  to  its seeming 
success may partly be found in some of the assertions identified by some respondents; To 
paraphrase them, the Security analyst, and Antwi-danso, asserted that the close inter-
connectedness and the cordial relationship among Ghanaians make it difficult for same to harm 
themselves hence their restraint to terrorism. 
More so, is the fact that unlike Nigeria, Ghana’s ‘artificial’ demarcation of borders by the British 
seems relatively minimal, the result of which is the relative lower ethnic, religious, and political 
divisions, cum their corresponding levels of lesser ethno-politico-religious skirmishes across the 
country. However, it could be contended that the current surge in global terrorism is a threat to all, 
including countries who have yet to experience the pangs of the phenomenon. And the fact that a 
country has not yet experienced a terrorist attack does not necessarily mean that it is under no 
threat. Against the background of this reasoning, it may be risky for Ghana/Ghanaians to live under 
the notion that they are adequately fortified against threats arising from terrorism.   
Also, the fact that social vices such as serial killing, cold-blood murders, domestic violence, and 
verbal/physical political attacks , to mention a few, happen in Ghana is an indication that 
Ghanaians are equally capable of perpetrating terrorist acts against fellow families, and friends, 
irrespective of their ‘close’ interconnectedness and ‘peace-loving nature’. Besides, the pockets of 
violence resulting from religious radicalization, the monumental socio-politico-economic hardship 
conditions, weak borders,  and the influx of refugees, for example, could spell doom for Ghana 
with the passage of time. And the fact that no situation is permanent gives extra weight to the 
possibilities of a change in status quo where citizens may succumb or subscribe to acts of terror to 
address their problems. However, whilst these concerns may arguably be far from reality, one 
cannot entirely rule out the possibility that the phenomenon could occur. For example, despite his 
skepticism about the risk of BH attacks against Ghana, the security analyst acknowledged the fact 
that certain groups could take advantage of what is happening in Nigeria and advance their cause 
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in Ghana. Similarly, despite his argument that poverty-induced terrorism could take a long time 
to happen in Ghana, Antwi-Dasno, however acknowledged that the tendency was as ‘real as the 
star’. More importantly, northern Ghana’s relatively rife poverty levels, unemployment, 
chieftaincy clashes, inter-ethnic violence, in the midst of pervasive and fledgling religious 
radicalization, and political upheavals, underpin the concerns of terrorism tendencies, and the need 
for stepping up counter terrorism efforts.  
The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems 
(factors) in the country put undue strains or pressure on individuals or groups to engage in any 
means necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as 
compared to the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This 
development elicits discontentment and grievances, which culminates in a sense of socio-politico-
economic alienation, and marginalization. At this point, unreliable institutions, poor governance, 
and corruption, which translate into loss of state’s legitimacy and or its institutions inform 
decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including terrorism) to 
press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the ideology, or 
recruitment, or propaganda of social movements, including terrorist organizations, whose 
ideologies, and cause may seem representative of their victims ‘concerns. Subsequently, they 
virtually emerge as de facto members of the ‘social movement’, sympathizing, and supporting the 
cause and ideology of their movement, and willing to execute same in their respective geographical 
locations. As a movement with de jure and de facto membership, they thrive on their collective 
human, logistical, operational, tactical and strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-
religious actions to achieve set targets, hence the theory of resource mobilization. Though the 
resource mobilization theory explains the springing up of strings of politically-aggrieved groups 
like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana, such groups are not terrorist groups, and do not possibly 
constitute threats of terrorism. Nevertheless, the theory is wholly reflective of the case in Nigeria 
where BH falls on diverse expertise of its de jure and de facto membership to advance their cause. 
This is seen in their merger with ISIS, training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), 
and Al-Shabaab.  
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From the above, it could be seen that the extent of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism 
reflective of BH 33 is high. The paper argues that the strengths of the country in terms of counter 
terrorism is woefully minimal as compared to its shortcomings. Though the paper admits that 
countries could fall prey to terrorist incidence irrespective of their concrete preparations, it is 
argued that reasonable amount of preparations are key to reducing such incidence, and their 
aftermath repercussions. From this perspective, as noted above, the threats posed to Ghana could 
be considerably categorized into two groups; territorial, and ideological threats. Therefore, attempt 
at finding lasting solutions to the menace should feature operational, and SPEAR, and 
mental/psychological approaches. The first part relates to threats triggered by weaknesses in 
internal, and external/border security operations; whilst the second relates to the general lack of 
socio-politico-economic, and religious interventions. Below offers a list of pragmatic proposals, 
and some strategic solutions to the threats, with the view to reducing them. 
5.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 
In looking to the future, Ghana has an opportunity to learn from countries that have suffered strings 
of terrorist attacks since it has not suffered any major terrorist incidence yet. Countries who could 
serve as a models include Nigeria, the US, and UK, to mention but a few. Ghana must spare no 
efforts at tapping from the wealth experience of these countries since it would go a long way to 
assist them [Ghanaians] gain broader insight and perspective on the phenomenon.  
Additionally, the current development means that government authorities, counter terrorism 
officials, security, policy makers, and all Ghanaians must rethink their conception of the 
phenomenon of terrorism. This may affect the approach of key stakeholders in tackling the rising 
incidence of threats.  
What follows below is a list of counter terrorism recommendations which are deemed effective. 
This list is not intended to be comprehensive but merely indicative of the measures. 
                                                          
33 The study also contends that Ghana’s vulnerability to the threats of terror is not limited to BH alone but its 
existence could be threatened by terrorists from around the world. BH was just used as a case study because of its 
uniqueness (in terms of the factors that occasioned its emergence, and the fact that it originated from Nigeria 
which shares similar SPEAR structures with Ghana) 
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The SPEAR recommendations should include but not limited to Anti-corruption, good governance, 
transparency, and accountability, job creation, economic development, poverty reduction, policy 
of all-inclusiveness, increased monitoring of NGO’s, and vigorously pursuing de-radicalization 
programs. Other recommendations include effective implementation of anti-terrorism programs, 
public education and sensitization on terrorism and security consciousness, provision of adequate 
logistics, and equipment, Effective Inter-agency communication, collaboration and cooperation, 
regular training of counter-terrorism stakeholders such as Judges, Prosecutors, forensic personnel, 
financial analysts), Effective border control,  ensure responsible media coverage, enhance national, 
and inter-tribal dialogue 
5.3 CONCLUSION  
Summarily, in an attempt to explore Ghana’s vulnerability to the threats of domestic and 
transnational terrorism, I explore the factors that give rise to the emergence of BH, and its 
insurgency, and juxtapose it with the current situation in Ghana. This attempt is to gain some 
understanding of how domestic factors could affect the occurrence of domestic terrorism in a 
particular country by using the Nigerian situation as a model for Ghana. The use of Nigeria as an 
exemplar and the juxtaposition stems from the similar social, political, economic, geographical, 
historical, and the religious composition shared by both countries. The study finds that a 
considerable number of factors that give rise to the emergence of BH, and its insurgencies are 
taking place in Ghana. Such factors include poverty, unemployment, poor governance, corruption, 
and political alienation in the midst of rising levels of religious radicalization. Nevertheless, the 
findings do not expose grave evidence of mass radicalization among the Ghanaian populace. 
Contrarily, it shows that northern Ghana remains a hot spot for (Islamic) religious radicalization 
owing to rampant wave of violent activities over there. Juxtaposing the relatively low number of 
radicalized people in Ghana with the fact that radicalization is a precondition to terrorism, it may 
be argued that the extent of Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of domestic and transnational 
terrorism may be minimal. This is anchored by the series of processes through which radicalization 
progresses. This may partly account for the reasons the country has not yet recorded a major 
incidence of terrorism despite the assertion that some few Ghanaian Muslims in the northern region 
have been radicalized or undergoing some series of radicalization processes. That notwithstanding, 
it could be argued that the few radicalized people constitute a threat in no small measure to the 
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state. This is because they could attack alone (lone wolves) and could influence their families and 
friends to take similar path. More to this point is that they may remain more susceptible to 
terrorists’ influences and events across the globe and could succumb to violent innovations and 
perpetrate them in Ghana. Additionally, the study shows that the adverse current SPEAR 
conditions in Ghana could be exploited by BH and other terrorists groups to cause violence in 
Ghana. In another vein the condition could trigger socio-politico-economic grievances which 
could necessitate the formation of social movements similar to terrorist groups to press home their 
demands.  
Moreover, the study identifies lapses within the state security structure in conjunction with inter-
agency cooperation and collaboration with Nigeria. The lack of effective institutional counter 
terrorism cooperation and collaboration between Ghana and Nigeria, capacity challenges, weak 
borders controls leading to ease of entry of criminals, further undermine the security and stability 
of Ghana.  
The findings in conjunction with the theory revealed that the presence of these structural problems 
(factors) in the country put undue strains on individuals or groups to engage in any means 
necessary to meet their expectations owing to their sense of relative deprivation, as compared to 
the political elites some of whom flaunt their wealth as they swim in corruption. This development 
provokes discontentment and grievances, which could culminate in as a sense of socio-politico-
economic alienation, and marginalization. Unreliable institutions, poor governance, and 
corruption, which translate into loss of state’s legitimacy and or its institutions could form basis 
for the decisions of the affected individuals to join or create social movements (including 
terrorism) to press home their demands. Given their vulnerability, others may also fall prey to the 
propaganda of terrorist organizations, whose ideologies and cause may fall in line with the 
concerns of their victims. Subsequently, they virtually emerge as de facto members of the ‘social 
movement,’ sympathizing, and supporting the cause and ideology of their movement, and willing 
to execute same in their respective geographical locations. As a movement with de jure and de 
facto membership, they thrive on their collective human, logistical, operational, tactical and 
strategic resources to champion their socio-politico-religious actions.   
The rise of politically-aggrieved groups like AFAG, CJA, LMVT in Ghana do not possibly 
constitute threats than BH who has become more transnational and their recent merger with ISIS, 
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training with Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQAP), and Al-Shabaab. The study highlights the 
fact that countries with similar structural features of particularly close geographical location, 
language, and religion, similar colonial masters, in addition to “close relationship,” may be 
confronted with similar challenges, and virtually influence each other by conscious calculations or 
otherwise. 
This research reveals that Ghana’s vulnerability to the threat of terrorism is not “imagined”, but 
“real”, and “emerging” at a higher degree. This is evidenced from threats posed by corruption, 
unemployment, poverty, poor governance, dwindling economy, unreliable institutions, 
transnational organized crimes, and religious radicalization which affect the bulk of the youth. The 
study finds that such factors could be exploited by terrorists groups (eg. BH et al); in their quest 
for global expansion. The results of the research further strengthens the potency of current 
terrorism and terrorists activities in Nigeria spreading to Ghana. It therefore adds weight to  Botha 
(2008) and Enders et al. (2011) findings which reveal that domestic terrorism in one country could 
influence the occurrence of same in another country (transnational terrorism);  Botha (2008 P. 39) 
observed that “…Algeria and Egypt serve as good examples of the exportation of domestic 
terrorism into a transnational network.  Also notable, are political instability, the illicit proliferation 
of small, and light weapons, terrorist groups, refugee crisis, and weak borders in the (West) African 
region are fertile grounds for a phenomenal increase in the menace. In addition, the external 
influences from pro-Islamic states and individuals who propagate religious extremism, punctuated 
by the transnational activities of terrorists across the region make Ghana much more vulnerable. 
The study finds that although Ghana is generally at risk, the northern part of the country remains 
the most exposed to these threats. The study identifies that Ghana’s continuous engagement in 
military interventions across the globe adds to its lists of vulnerability as evidenced in reprisal, and 
retaliatory attacks by Al-Shabaab, BH, and ISIS. 
It may be clear that the country has earmarked a number of legislative, and institutional 
instruments, structures, and frameworks to apparently counter all forms of terrorism, and its related 
incidences. Aside its anti-terrorism mechanisms, conventions, and protocols of domestic, and 
international standards, it could boast of anti-terror agencies, and their close collaboration with 
transnational security apparatus not limited to the Police, the Military, and the intelligence 
services. Ghana also has a number of conflict-resolution, and inter-religious bodies and institutions 
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that work to arresting the aforesaid threats. The Ghana Peace Council is worthy of mentioning. 
Whilst not denying the salience, and relevance of these measures, and their immense contributions 
to counter terrorism operations, their efficacy could be hampered by corruption, and other ills of 
the Ghanaian society, which might render the nation’s anti-terror efforts redundant, and counter-
productive. Besides, victims of terrorist attacks such as the US, among others have very 
sophisticated security measures, yet they seem inadequate in the face of the successful terrorists’ 
attacks. This highlights the fact that no preparation could be enough to counter terrorism, given 
the terrorists’ the asymmetric nature of terrorist warfare. Yet, proper measures could largely assist 
in reducing such incidence, if not eradicate them. 
The study argues that since a “sound strategy is a prerequisite for success” (de Wijk 2005), key 
stakeholders, and institutions in Ghana are to develop a set of strategy that reflects the ever 
increasing sophistication of terrorism. Consequently, identifying strategic solutions to the 
aforesaid socio-politico-economic, cum the growing religious radicalization challenges of Ghana 
is key in this regard.  
Appendix One - The concept of Terrorism - Continued 
The term terrorism is sometimes used interchangeably with radicalization. Like terrorism, the 
definition of radicalization is problematic and controversial because there are diverse views and 
interpretations to its meaning. Borum (2011) argues that radicalization’ is used relative in two 
broad areas in people’s quest for changes in society. It involves the use of violence or non-violence 
in the attainment of set objectives. Hence, the term violent radicalization  negates the presence of 
any nexus between radicalization, and violence (Mandel 2010). The conflicting positions therefore 
account for different counter radicalization/terrorism approaches. For example, some school of 
thought views socio-politico-economic problems as compelling causes of radicalization and by 
extension terrorism. This has formed basis for their recommendations for socio-politico-economic 
interventions such as anti-poverty, development, education etc, as remedies to terrorism  (Taşpınar 
2009). Nevertheless, the engagement of the rich, and educated people in terrorism inform other 
schools of thought to reject the notion that radicalization, and to some degree, terrorism is borne 
out of poverty, unemployment, etc. 
 Silber et al. (2007) outline four main ‘stages’ under which radicalized people evolve. They include 
pre-radicalization, self-radicalization, indoctrination and Jihadization. Arguably, these findings 
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reveal that radicalization largely serves as an important precondition through which all terrorists 
undergo - one must be radicalized before becoming a terrorist. Approximately, sixteen theories 
have been propounded in a bid to explaining the causes of radicalization and terrorism (Crossett 
& Spitaletta 2010). Borum (2011) posits that radicalization becomes terrorism when the 
radicalized group adopts extremist beliefs in support of violence. Borum’s conception of the term 
parallels definitions offered by a number of Western Intelligence agencies. According to Dutch 
Security Services (2005) cited in (Borum 2011),  radicalization involves “growing readiness to 
pursue and/or support - if necessary by undemocratic means – far-reaching changes in society that 
conflict with, or pose a threat to the democratic order. The Danish intelligence Service, (PET 2009) 
defines it as “a process by which a person to an increasing extent accepts the use of undemocratic 
or violent means, including terrorism in an attempt to reach a specific political/ideological 
objective. Additionally, the term involves the process by which people support terrorism, and in 
some cases, join terrorist groups (UK Home Office 2011). 
For purposes of this study, radicalization means the processes, events, or conditions through which 
people undergo and to adopt ‘extreme’ ideas that motivate them to champion their cause, beliefs 
or ideologies via acts of violence. The term could also be understood as the use of violent means 
in meeting political or religious ends. In a broader sense, this study therefore acknowledges all the 
aforementioned definitions of radicalization as such. From this perspective, to get radicalized is to 
violently pursue a political/religious agenda through extremism. In this light, radicalization is an 
important contributory factor to terrorism and the recruitment of people into terrorist organizations. 
It is for this reason de-radicalization programs 34 has emerged as a major counter-terrorism policy 
35especially in North America, and Europe. To this end, this research recognizes groups that resort 
to violence in addressing their concerns as terrorists owing to their extreme ideas that result in 
violence and insurgency.  
                                                          
34 Means programs performed by security agencies, and civil society organizations which focus on working with 
individuals or groups that are involved in radical social movements, terrorist organizations, or clandestine political, 
religious or ideological violence “ with the view to ‘purging’ them off violent radical ideas, and re-integrating them 
into society – (International Relations and Security Network 2015) 
35 The introduction of de-radicalization programs as an addition to other counter terrorism programs has sparked 
debate among some scholars. For example, ….maintains that despite its significance, the fact that it has been 
securitized by policy makers, might undermine some functions of other counter terrorism programs – ISN 2015) 
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Insurgency is “a usually violent attempt to take control of a government: a rebellion or uprising.” 
Or, “a condition of revolt against a government that is less than an organized revolution and that 
is not recognized as belligerency”  (Merriam-Webster Inc. 2015b). Since BH is bent on toppling 
the government of Nigeria and introduce a sharia-based regime, the group could be considered to 
be insurgent. However, since both parties to the conflict recognize themselves as belligerent 
factions engaged in (asymmetric) warfare, punctuated with the fact that BH36 engages in more than 
an “organized revolution,” and adopts the strategies of terrorists, identifies BH as a terrorist 
organization. In this regard, the terms insurgency, and insurgents, are used interchangeably with 
terrorism, and terrorists, respectively. Other terms such as extremism/extremists, 
militancy/militants, and Islamism/Islamists, inter alia, were used sparingly, and synonymously 
with terrorism/terrorists in the research.  
Threat 
The Cambridge Dictionary Online (2015) defines threat as a suggestion that something unpleasant 
or violent will happen, especially if a particular action or order is not followed. Also, google 
(2015d) defines the term as a statement of an intention to inflict pain, injury, damage, or other 
hostile action on 37someone in retribution for something done or not done. The definition also 
covers a person or thing likely to cause damage or danger (ibid.). For the purpose of this research, 
the threats relates to the extent of measure or tendency on the part of Ghana to suffer terrorist 
attacks, and the degree of susceptibility of its citizenry to ideological influence of terrorists. In 
other words, how prone is Ghana to terrorist attacks, and ideological influence? This study 
identifies potential sources of threat to Ghana arising from terrorism to include but not limited to 
activities, actions and inactions of people violent ideologies, beliefs, ideas, doctrine, porous 
borders and proliferation of small arms and light weapons which have the tendency to undermine 
Ghana’s security and provide avenues for terrorist attacks. This includes a situation where 
Ghanaians and non-Ghanaians consciously or unconsciously embrace, and import violent, and 
extreme ideas with the intention of perpetrating them against Ghana.  
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Appendix Two – Interviewees’ Details 
Interview 
Venue 
Interviewees Designation of Interviewees 
Accra Custom Official Customs Excise and Preventive Service 
Accra Mr. Alex Adu Ghana Immigration Service  
Accra Ms. Adwoa Sika Ghana Immigration Service 
Accra DSP Edward Afful Criminal Investigations Department (Counter 
terrorism Unit) 
Accra CSP. Nii Ammaa 
Amartey 
Ghana Police Service (Investigation and Counter 
terrorism Unit) 
Accra Security Analyst Bureau of National Investigations 
Accra Commodore Osei-Sarfo Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College 
Accra Group Captain John 
Ankah 
Ghana Armed Forces Command and Staff College 
Accra Dr. Emmanuel Kwesi 
Aning 
Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and 
Training Centre 
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Accra Dr. Thomas Jaye Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and 
Training Centre 
Accra Dr. Colonel Kotia Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and 
Training Centre 
Accra Mr. John Pokoo Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and 
Training Centre  
Accra Dr. Nicholas Okai Kofi Annan International Peace keeping and 
Training Centre 
Accra Dr. Vladimir Antwi-
Danso 
Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy 
Accra Dr. Kennedy E. Ahorsu Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy 
Accra Dr. Philip Attuquayefio Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy 
Accra Mrs. Yakohene Legon Centre for International Affairs & Diplomacy 
Accra Mr. Conrad Kakraba Ghana Broadcasting Corporation 
Accra Ms. Debrie Emefa University of Ghana 
Sunyani Elvis Oliver Kwakye University of Natural Resources 
Sunyani Ms. Selina Awini University of Natural Resources 
 
NB: The interviews took place between January 17, 2015 and February 17, 2015 
 
Appendix Three – Interview Guides 
1. What is terrorism? Could you give example (s)? 
2. What accounts for terrorism? 
3. What is radicalization? Could you give example (s)? 
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4. Briefly describe Nigeria’s Boko Haram in one sentence. 
5. In what ways could Ghana help to combat ‘Boko Haram’ or help resolve the ‘Boko 
Haram crises? 
6. Briefly narrate the origin of Boko Haram. 
7. What factors do you think have accounted for the ‘terrorism’ engineered by the ‘Boko 
Haram’ Islamist sect? 
8. What are your views on the political, religious, social, economic and cultural 
dimensions to the Boko Haram crisis? 
9. Is the ‘Boko Haram problem’ exclusively Nigeria’s, and why? 
10. What are the (perceived) effects of the ‘crisis on West Africa, Africa and the World? 
11. What does the ‘Boko Haram insurgency’ in Nigeria mean for ECOWAS, AU, and the 
UN? 
12. How should the necessary organizations/institutions, and stakeholders deal with the 
situation in Nigeria? 
13. Does Ghana have a special responsibility in assisting Nigeria to combating ‘Boko 
Haram’? If yes, why? 
14. Is there a need for Ghana to support Nigeria in the fight against ‘Boko Haram’? Why? 
15. Is Ghana’s foreign policy towards Nigeria favorable or otherwise? Why is it so? 
16. Is there any provision in Ghana’s foreign policy that reflects its counter-terrorism 
measures? If yes, how? 
17. To what extent are Ghana’s counter-terrorism measures effective and efficient? 
18. Could you give examples of situations where countries depend on one another for 
assistance in the fight against terrorism? 
19. Does Ghana have an effective domestic counter-terrorism measure in place? 
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20. How would you assess the level of competence of Ghana’s security agencies (military, 
police, intelligence, etc) in curbing the spread of terrorism, and terrorist groups in 
Ghana? 
21. In your view, is there any relationship between poverty and terrorism, and why? 
22. How could Ghana handle its political, social, religious, economic and cultural issues in 
order to prevent domestic terrorism? 
23. Do you perceive Ghana to be under a possible threat of a terror attack and why? 
24. Do you think Ghana is adequately prepared for any eventual terror attack within and 
without its borders? 
 
i With a mix of marginalization and political alienation 
                                                          
